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WE can hardly be expected at this late day, in this ancient Commonwealth especially, to go into any labored argument in favor of popular education, either as a matter of right, or as the only firm foundation of a free government. For ourselves, we hold that every child, born into a community, is born with as good a natural right to the best education that community can furnish, as he is to a share of the common air of heaven, or the common light of the sun. We hold also that the community, which neglects to provide the best education it can for all its children, whether male or female, black or white, rich or poor, bond or free, forfeits its right to punish the offender. We hold, moreover, that a popular government unsupported by popular education is a baseless fabric.

But, while we bear our unequivocal testimony in favor of universal education, and assert the duty of every community to provide the best education in its power for all its children, we are very far from regard-

ing everything which passes or may pass under the name of education, as something to be approved and never condemned. Education may be bad as well as good, a curse as well as a blessing; and in general its quality is a matter of even more importance than its quantity. Educated, in some sense, all our children are, and will be, whether we will or not. Education, such as it is, is ever going on. Our children are educated in the streets, by the influence of their associates, in the fields and on the hill sides, by the influences of surrounding scenery and overshadowing skies, in the bosom of the family, by the love and gentleness, or wrath and fretfulness of parents, by the passions or affections they see manifested, the conversations to which they listen, and above all by the general pursuits, habits, and moral tone of the community. In all these are school rooms and school masters, sending forth scholars educated for good or for evil, or what is more likely, for a little of both. The real question for us to ask is not, Shall our children be educated? but, To what end shall they be educated, and by what means? What is the kind of education needed, and how shall it be furnished?

As to the quality of the education to be furnished, we apprehend our community, like most other communities, has no very clear or worthy conceptions. Education, in that sense in which it deserves the grave consideration and the earnest efforts of the community, is something more than the mere ability to read, write, and cypher; and something more too than what is commonly meant by moral and intellectual culture. It is properly defined, The fitting of the individual man for fulfilling his destiny, of attaining to the end, accomplishing the purposes, for which God hath made him. The system of education, which doth not take my child from the cradle, and train him up to go forth into the world a man, in the deep significance of that term, to comprehend the end for which he was made, and the surest and speediest means of attaining to it, is defective, and can never answer the legitimate purposes of education.

We suppose it will be generally admitted, that man has an end, that he was created for a purpose. This has always been believed. It is implied in the first question of the Catechism: "What is the chief end of man?" Man's worth, perfection, is in exact proportion to the steadiness and success with which he pursues this end. Education is properly that which discloses to him this end, and prepares him to pursue it, points out to him the road he must take, and furnishes him with provisions and strength for his journey.

This end is twofold, corresponding to man's twofold nature, individual and social. Man has a destiny as an individual, and also a destiny as a social being, as a member of society, and in this country as a member of the body politic. Education divides itself therefore into two branches; 1st, that which answers the question, What is my destiny as an individual, and fits me for attaining it; and 2dly, that which answers the question, What is the destiny of society, and fits me to coöperate in its attainment.

As an individual I am something more than the farmer, the shoemaker, the blacksmith, the lawyer, the physician, or the clergyman. Back of my professional character, there lies the man, that which I possess in common with all my species, and which is the universal and permanent ground of my being as a man. This education must reach, call forth, and direct, as well as my professional pursuit. Individual education is divided then into general education and special, — my education as a man, and my education as a doctor, lawyer, minister, artisan, artist, agriculturist, or merchant.

Special education appears to be that which we at present are most anxious to make provision for. Few people think of anything beyond it. The popular doctrine, we believe, is that we should be educated in special reference to what is to be our place in society and our pursuit in life. We think more of education as a means of fitting us for a livelihood, than for any-

thing else. The tendency has long been to sink the man in what are merely his accidents, to qualify him for a profession or pursuit, rather than to be a man. Special education has no doubt its place, and its utility, which must by no means be thought lightly of. In a community where hereditary distinctions obtain, where professions and pursuits are transmitted from father to son, it must ever be the main branch of education. In India, the son of a Bramin should be educated to be a Bramin, because he can there, according to the established order of society, be a Bramin and nothing else. The son of one of the warrior caste requires to be educated as a warrior, and nothing else. So of the children of the other castes. For in Indian society there are no men; Humanity is not admitted; a common nature is not recognised; therefore a general education as men, the education of Humanity, is inadmissible. But in our community it is different. Here professions and pursuits are merely the accidents of individual life. Behind them we recognise Humanity, as paramount to them all. Here man, in theory at least, is man, not the mere artisan, farmer, trader, or learned professor. Professions and pursuits may be changed according to judgment, will, or caprice, as circumstances permit, or render necessary or advisable. Consequently here we want an education for that which is permanent in man, which contemplates him as back of all the accidents of life, and which shall be equally valuable to him, whatever be the mutations which go on around him, the means he may choose or be compelled to adopt to obtain a livelihood.

General education, which some may term the culture of the soul, which we choose to term the education of Humanity, we regard as the first and most important branch of education. This is the education which fits us for our destiny, to attain our end as simple human beings. But in order to impart this education, or in order to educate our children in reference to this destiny or end, we must know what

is our destiny or end as human beings. The character of the education will depend almost entirely on the view we take of man's destiny, on the answer we give to the question, "What is the chief end of man?"

If we look upon man as a mere child of earth, born of the dust, and returning to the dust again, possessing no lofty and deathless energies to be called forth and set at work, the education we shall seek to furnish must of necessity be essentially different from what we should seek to give, did we believe man was created in the image of God, immortal, endowed with a moral nature, made capable of endless growth in knowledge and love, and destined one day to stand higher in the scale of being than the tallest archangel now stands. If we believe man accomplishes his destiny on this earth, in the narrow compass of this transitory life, then for this world only shall we seek to educate our children; but if we believe that this world is but the cradle, in which our infancy is rocked, this life but our entrance into existence, but the beginning of a life never to end, that the faculties, the germs of which make their first appearance here, are to be developed elsewhere, and the destiny begun in time is to find its completion in the fulness of eternity, then for eternity, for eternal existence, and everlasting growth must we educate our children.

Now what is that which answers the question, What is the destiny of man? What is the chief end of man? With here and there one it may be philosophy; but with mankind at large, it is religion. Religion is the solution to man's soul of the problem of his destiny, the answer he gives, or rather which is given him, to those solemn questions which do ever and anon rise within him; What am I? Whence came I? Whither do I go? How came I here? Why am I here? What is the purpose of this frail existence? this life of trial and sorrow? These are questions, which all men at some period of their lives are forced to ask.

A thousand incidents occur to force these questions upon our attention. Our life here is not a calm and unbroken stream, bearing its undisturbed course onward into the great ocean of being. All things around us change. Nothing is permanent. The flowers fade and disappear; the grass withers and dies; the fashion of this world passeth away. We everywhere encounter enemies to our peace, obstacles to our enjoyment; perpetually are our desires thwarted, our plans defeated, our hopes blasted. We are wounded often in the tenderest part of our nature, our purest and holiest affections are sported with; we love and find no return; we love and are beloved, and yet must not embrace the one we love; we are disappointed in those to whom we have given our hearts; our friends on whom we leaned pass away, and we are without prop or support; those we love suffer, and we cannot relieve them;—these and ten thousand other things force us to pause in our career, throw us back upon ourselves, and raise within us the problem of our destiny.* When this problem is once started, we suffer the deepest sorrow till we find its solution. We weep much that no man is found able to open the book. Religion is the solution of the problem, the Lion of the tribe of Judah, that prevails to open the book and to loose the seals thereof. Hence its value, and the reason why men cling to it with such tenacity, and hold him their worst enemy who would arraign it. The love and reverence men have for Christianity grow out of this fact, that it solves for them this problem, which is so torturing in its nature, and gives them a clear view of the destiny which God has assigned them. Hence, too, the impotence of all those

* For an able and eloquent discussion of this subject, see Jouffroy. *Mélanges Philosophiques*, p. 423, et seq. *Du Problème de la Destinée humaine*. The substance of this interesting article may be found in Mr. Ripley's introductory notice to his translations from Jouffroy, in his *Philosophical Miscellanies*, a work of which we have heretofore spoken in terms of high, but not too high, commendation.

who war against religion, and the folly of all those who fear such warring may be successful. So long as there is sorrow or aught to cause sorrow in this world, so long as man meets with obstacles to his instincts, and is interrupted in his march to his destiny, so long there will, there must be religion. There are but few moments in one's life when he is prosperous enough, successful enough, strong enough, happy enough, to dispense with religion. The human heart is a fountain of tears, and from the innermost being of whomsoever lives, sorrow is ever welling up. They are fools who say,

“O happiness! our being's end and aim.”

Man, in this life at least, has nothing to do with happiness, and, were he wise, he would cease to trouble himself with its vain pursuit. Let him seek to fulfil the purpose of his being, and he may find at times solace and refreshment. But the word *happiness* should have as little place in our vocabulary, as it has in our hearts. Man has a destiny, an end he should seek to gain, and religion is the answer to the question, What is this end, this destiny? According to the principles we have laid down, then, education, to be complete, to be what it ought to be, must be religious. An education which is not religious is a solemn mockery. Those, who would exclude religion from education, are not yet in the condition to be teachers; long years yet do they need to remain in the Primary School.

Man is also a social being, and needs an education corresponding to his social nature. He is not a mere individual. He stands not alone. “It is not good for man to be alone,” said his Creator, and brought forth from his side Eve, blooming in beauty, blushing with charms, full of tenderness and love, to break the solitude, clothe the dusty earth with soft verdure, give the flowers of Paradise their varied hues and sweet fragrance. In Eve Adam found the complement of his being, and rose to manhood. He, who has not

loved, who has not felt that love which melts two human beings into one, and of the twain makes one flesh, has not yet attained to manhood. He has perceived none of the deep mysteries of his being; of the immortality of the affections he has conceived nothing; and the infinite fulness of his nature lies shrouded in deep night. It is not till one loves, that he receives intimations of a higher nature, of the wonderful capacities with which he is created, is raised from himself, and permitted to see and taste something of that Fulness from the bosom of which the universe proceeded, and in whose embrace it reposes. It is then that he begins to attain to manhood. He is then a child no longer. He is alone no longer. He belongs now to the universe, and has a place in it. Love unites him to Eve and Eve to him, and from all-creating love springs the Family, and from the Family Society, crowned by the State. Love makes him a man, and multiplies his relations and ties without number, links the first man to the youngest child of the latest generation, and gathers and cements all individuals, however scattered over the face of the globe, sleeping beneath the earth, or riding in sun-chariots through the heavens, into one round, compact, and indissoluble whole. Thus love gives each individual an interest in the whole, a part and a lot in all, and what is better yet, a work. Proceeding from love, made capable of loving with a love that can triumph over time and all its mutations, over pain, sickness, sorrow, death, and the grave, and bloom in immortal beauty when all else has become withered and dry, man has a social nature, is a social being, and needs a social education.

Other problems now come up. What is the mission of the family? What is the mission of the state? What is the destiny of society, of the human race itself? Great problems are these, weighty, and no doubt of difficult solution. But how give man a proper social education without solving these weighty problems? That deserves not the name of a social

education, which leaves untouched the problem of society, the destiny of the race. And the social education must needs vary precisely as vary our solutions of this problem. In Russia they solve this problem in their fashion. Society has there for its object, the accomplishment of the will and the manifestation of the glory of the Autocrat. Hence, the Russian children are carefully instructed in their duty to the Emperor, carefully taught, by authority, that they and all they may possess are his, and that they must love him in their hearts, and honor him as their God. In Austria the problem is solved much in the same way, and so also in Prussia. Absolutism has its solution, and educates accordingly; Liberalism has also its solution, and its corresponding education.

In this country we do not solve the problem as they do in Russia, Austria, and Prussia. We deny that it is the end of society to manifest the glory and accomplish the will of the Emperor, or even of the State. Here society does not exist for the government, but the government exists as an agent of society. The mission of the government is to aid society in working out its destiny. The education then approved in Russia, Austria, or Prussia, cannot be approved here. Which solution is the true one, ours, or the one given by Absolutism?

Again. What is the destiny of society? Has it attained its perfection? Is its organization perfect? Does it give free scope to man's whole social nature, and bring out all his social instincts? Shall we labor to keep it precisely where it is? prevent it from going backward or forward? Or is society imperfect as it is? Is it progressive in its nature? Is there room to hope for a more perfect arrangement for man's social instincts? Is it our privilege to hope that the evils we now see and deplore may be at length lessened if not removed; and is it our duty to labor to realize that social Ideal which haunts the souls of the Prophets and Seers of Humanity? Here are questions of immense magnitude, which the educator

should be able to answer, and which in some way every social educator does answer.

Still other questions are involved in these; on which element should society be based, the aristocratic element, or the democratic? If the aristocratic element be the true foundation of social order, then should our schools be under the control of the aristocracy, be aristocratic in their basis and superstructure, and be nurseries of the aristocratic principle. But, if the democratic element be the true basis of society, then should the social education give the democratic solution of the problem, create a love for democracy, and discountenance every aristocratic tendency. It should, also, not only accept the democratic element, but disclose the means by which it may insure the victory, and make all other social elements subordinate to itself. It must, then, touch the nature and organization of the state, determine the mission of government, and the measures it must adopt in order to secure or advance the democracy. It rushes into the midst of politics, then, and decides on national banks and sub-treasuries. An education, which does not go thus far, is incomplete, and insufficient for our social wants.

Education, then, must be religious and social, or political. Neither religion nor politics can be excluded. Indeed, all education that is worth anything is either religious or political, and fits us for discharging our duties, either as simple human beings, or as members of society.

If, then, we are to have in the Commonwealth a system of popular education, which shall answer the legitimate purposes of education, we must have a system which shall embrace both religion and politics. Religion and politics do, in fact, embrace all the interests and concerns of human beings, in all their multiplied relations. Nothing can concern me as a man, as an individual, or as a member of society, which cannot be arranged under one or the other. That education, then, which does not embrace either,

must be worthless, because in no sense fitting us for performing our part, either as men or as citizens.

Assuming now the absolute necessity of religious and political education, and the worthlessness of every other kind of education, when taken alone, the great and the practical question becomes, How is this education to be provided? In what schools, and under what schoolmasters?

We have looked into the Reports before us, with the hope of finding an answer to this question; but here, as everywhere else in this world, we have been doomed to disappointment. The great problem, education is to work out, the end we have stated education should always contemplate, the Honorable Board, and its learned and eloquent Secretary, seem never to have conceived of. We find no leading idea, no enlarged views, no comprehensive measures; nothing, in fact, to inspire us with the least confidence in the Board, or its labors, as a means of aiding us to an education worthy of a free and Christian Commonwealth. That the Board does, indeed, propose to advance the cause of education, we do not deny. It proposes, for this purpose, two measures; 1st, improvements in the methods of teaching, and 2dly, the establishment of Normal Schools, or schools for teachers. The first measure is, doubtless, well enough, as far as it goes. The machinery of teaching, if we may so speak, should be perfected, and the best possible methods of imparting knowledge found out and adopted. But, however perfect may be our machinery for teaching, it will amount to little, unless we have somewhat to teach, and also somewhat to teach, which is worth the teaching. The Normal Schools, which the Board proposes to establish, will do nothing to impart such an education as we contend for. The most we can hope from them is some little aid to teachers in the methods of teaching. Beyond improving the mechanism of education, they will be powerless, or mischievous.

Schools for teachers require in their turn teachers, as well as any other class of schools. Who, then, are

to be the teachers in these Normal Schools? What is to be taught in them? Religion and politics? What religion, what politics? These teachers must either have some religious and political faith, or none. If they have none, they are mere negations, and therefore unfit to be entrusted with the education of the educators of our children. If they have a religious and a political faith, they will have one which only a part of the community hold to be true. If the teachers in these schools are Unitarians, will Trinitarians accept their scholars as educators? Suppose they are Calvinists, will Universalists, Methodists, Unitarians, and Quakers be content to install their pupils as instructors in common schools?

But the Board assure us Christianity shall be insisted on so far, and only so far, as it is common to all sects. This, if it mean anything, means nothing at all. All, who attempt to proceed on the principle here laid down, will find their Christianity ending in nothingness. Much may be taught in general, but nothing in particular. No sect will be satisfied; all sects will be dissatisfied. For, it is not enough that my children are not educated in a belief contrary to my own; I would have them educated to believe what I hold to be important truth; and I always hold that to be important truth, wherein I differ from others. A faith, which embraces generalities only, is little better than no faith at all. Nor is this all. There is, in fact, no common ground between all the various religious denominations in this country, on which an educator may plant himself. The difference between a Unitarian and a Calvinist is fundamental. They start from different premises. Their difference does not consist in the fact that they come to different conclusions, but that they adopt different starting points. The Gospel of Jesus Christ is "another gospel," as expounded by the one, from what it is as expounded by the other. No Calvinist can teach Christianity, if he be honest, so as to satisfy a conscientious and earnest Unitarian. No Unitarian, if he be an earnest and con-

scientious Unitarian, can discourse on religion so as to satisfy a Trinitarian. The solution of the problem of human destiny given by the one is not that given by the other. The one embraces a philosophy which the other rejects.

If we come into politics, we encounter the same difficulty. What doctrines on the destiny of society will these Normal Schools inculcate? If any, in this Commonwealth, at present, they must be whig doctrines, for none but whigs can be professors in these schools. Now the whig doctrines on society are directly hostile to the democratic doctrines. Whiggism is but another name for Hobbism. It is based on materialism, and is atheistical in its logical tendencies. That all whigs are aware of this, we do by no means assert; that any of them are, is by no means probable; but this alters not the fact. Whiggism denies the internal light; it denies that there is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding. In religion, the whig must depend upon the uncertain ground of history and criticism; in politics, also, upon history and criticism. In neither does he recognise in man the criterion of truth, the universal reason, whereof each man is made a partaker, the ultimate authority in all matters pertaining to religion and politics. In his creed all is imposed, nothing is generated; all comes to us from abroad, nothing from within. Hence his reverence for antiquity, his regard for precedents, and his distrust of the people. Now, we need hardly say, that all this is directly contrary to the faith of the democrat. Democracy is based on the fundamental truth, that there is an element of the Supernatural in every man, placing him in relation with universal and absolute truth; that there is a true light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world; that a portion of the spirit of God is given unto every man to profit withal. Democracy rests, therefore, on spiritualism, and is of necessity a believer in God and in Christ. Nothing but spiritualism has the requisite unity and universality to meet the

wants of the masses. Now, whoever teaches one of these systems, must of necessity offend the advocates of the other. I am a Democrat. Can I entrust my children to the care of those who are to me virtually Atheists? All ideas are connected. The whig educator may, indeed, refrain from teaching my children the importance of whig measures, but he cannot refrain from teaching them the whig philosophy. Imbue them with this philosophy, and they are secured to the whig party, to the whig cause. Establish, then, your whig Board of Education; place on it a single Democrat, to save appearances; enable this Board to establish Normal Schools, and through them to educate all the children of the Commonwealth; authorize them to publish common school libraries, to select all the books used in school, and thus to determine all the doctrines which our children shall imbibe, and what will be the result? We have then given to some half a dozen whigs, the responsible office of forming the political-faith and conscience of the whole community. We have done all that can be done to give Whiggism a self-perpetuating power; all that we can do to make a community of practical infidels. Are we prepared for this result?

The truth is, we have, in the establishment of this Board of Education, undertaken to imitate despotic Prussia, without considering the immense distance between the two countries. The craft of the king of Prussia is altogether more admirable than his love of the people. He has seen, what European kings are beginning to see, and what the French Revolution has made quite evident, that the people will have education, and that they cannot much longer be kept in submission to their masters by brute force. "The schoolmaster is abroad," and cannot be sent home again. What, then, remains for absolute kings? Simply to shake hands with the schoolmaster. They must enlist the schoolmaster in their cause. In order to do this effectually, they must have the forming of the schoolmaster, make him their stipendiary, and prohibit

him from teaching aught, except what they dictate. Hence, the Prussian system of education, a skilful attempt of Absolutism to steal the march on Liberalism, to fight Liberalism with its own weapons.

Let it be borne in mind, that in Prussia the whole business of education is lodged in the hands of government. The government establishes the schools in which it prepares the teachers; it determines both the methods of teaching, and the matters taught. It commissions all teachers, and suffers no one to engage in teaching without authority from itself. Who sees not then, that all the teachers will be the pliant tools of the government, and that the whole tendency of the education given will be to make the Prussians obedient subjects of Frederic the king? Who sees not that education in Prussia is supported merely as the most efficient arm of the police, and fostered merely for the purpose of keeping out revolutionary, or what is the same thing, liberal ideas?

Let us glance at what is actually taught in these much admired Prussian schools, and we shall find confirmation still stronger, if possible, of what we assert. What, then, does Frederic William allow his dear subjects to be taught? First and foremost, the catechisms of the two established churches, that is, the catechism of the Lutheran church to the children of Lutherans, and that of the Catholic church to the children of Catholics. Then they are taught the private and domestic virtues, and their duty to their lord the king. Have they lessons on the rights of man, their duties to the public, and the duty of governments to the people? Let an imprudent schoolmaster but broach these topics, and how long, think ye, he would be permitted to teach? Let a teacher, or let the parents of the children taught, but introduce into a school a book not designated by the government, especially a book which should agitate somewhat profoundly the great problems of the destiny of man and of society, and would the government, think ye, acquiesce? No; the whole system of Prussian edu-

cation, which is well adapted, in many respects, to form the Prussian youth to the love and practice of the several duties of private and domestic life, is mainly designed to implant despotism in the intellect and the heart, to forestall the craving of freedom, and to make man, born to be free, to stand up a man amongst men in the image of his Maker, contented to be a slave, and a supporter of Absolutism on principle.

And this is the system of education, in principle, which the fathers of our Commonwealth are seeking to establish here. They have taken advantage of the alleged deficiency of good teachers, to demand what they choose to call Normal Schools. In default of good common school libraries, they have undertaken to prepare a series of publications, which they will at first take the liberty to recommend, and which afterwards they may ask of the legislature authority to enjoin. They assume the authority now to recommend the proper books to be studied, and soon they will try for authority to dictate. As soon as they can get their Normal Schools into successful operation, they will so arrange it, if they can, that no public school shall be permitted to employ a teacher who has not graduated at a Normal School. Then all liberty of instruction, the evil so complained of in France, and which was not among the least of the causes which brought about the revolution of 1830, will be felt here in all its force. Adieu then to republicanism, to social progress.

A government system of education in Prussia is not inconsistent with the theory of Prussian society; for there all wisdom is supposed to be lodged in the government. But the thing is wholly inadmissible here; not because the government may be in the hands of Whigs or Democrats, but because, according to our theory, the people are supposed to be wiser than the government. Here, the people do not look to the government for light, for instruction, but the government looks to the people. The people give the law to the government. To entrust, then, the

government, with the power of determining the education which our children shall receive, is entrusting our servant with the power to be our master. This fundamental difference between the two countries, we apprehend, has been overlooked by the Board of Education, and its supporters. In a free government, there can be no teaching by authority, and all attempts to teach by authority are so many blows struck at its freedom. We may as well have a religion established by law, as a system of education, and the government educate and appoint the pastors of our churches, as well as the instructors of our children.

This is not all. The theory of our institutions rests on the progressive nature of man and society. Our institutions everywhere recognise the principle of progress. In most, if not all other countries, progress involves revolution. Here it is the established order, and we have made constitutional provisions for improvement. All our State constitutions contain provisions for amendment, when the people come to judge amendments necessary. In fact, we regard the end of society to advance. There is always a future before us, a good, not yet reached, to be attained. Hence, to be true to our theory, we must be always looking ahead, struggling to advance. To this end should all our systems of education, whether devised for the district school, the academy, the college, the university, directly or indirectly tend; but to this end they cannot tend, if left to the management of the government.

Introduce now a system of Normal Schools, under the supervision of a government Board of Education. These Schools must have professors. But who will these professors be? They must be popular men; men of reputation, not men who have the good of the people at heart, and are known only by their fidelity to popular interests, but men who are generally regarded as safe; in whom the mass of the active members of the community have confidence. But on what condition does a man come into this category of pop-

ular men? Simply on the condition, that he represent, to a certain extent, the opinions now dominant. A man, who represents the past, is not a popular man, nor is he who represents the future, but he who represents the present. The man, who has the misfortune to think in advance of his contemporaries, and to crave a good for Humanity beyond that already attained, is necessarily unpopular. If he venture to translate his thoughts into words, and his cravings into deeds, he will be called hard names, deemed an enemy to God and man, or a well-intentioned dreamer, who, whatever be thought of his intellect or motives, is never to be trusted. Men, who have faith in the future, whose mental vision sweeps a broader than the vulgar horizon, whose souls burn to raise up the low, to break the fetters of the captive, to open the prison doors to those that are bound, to preach glad tidings to the poor, hope to the desponding, consolation to the sorrowing, and life to the dead, must always count, — whatever the hold they may take on men's higher nature, — on being distrusted, and, to no inconsiderable degree, discarded by their own age. They cannot but be misinterpreted. They must pass for what they are not, and would abhor to be. They cannot, therefore, become professors in Normal Schools, unless it be by accident, and if by accident they become professors, they will be forthwith silenced or dismissed; a fact of which Professor Cousin is an eminent witness. What theological seminary would have selected Jesus, Paul, or John, in their lifetime, for a professor of theology? Nay, what Board of Education on earth, would make the editor of the Boston Quarterly Review a professor in a Normal School?

In order to be popular, one must uphold things as they are, disturb the world with no new views, and alarm no private interest by uttering the insurrectionary word, Reform. He must merely echo the sentiments and opinions he finds in vogue; and he who can echo these the loudest, the most distinctly, and in the most agreeable voice, is sure to be the most

popular man,—for a time. Men of this stamp do never trouble their age; they are never agitators, and there is no danger that they will stir up any popular commotion; they are the men to be on Boards of Education, professors in colleges, constables, mayors, members of legislative assemblies, presidents, and parish clerks. Such men look for in colleges, and, therefore, look rarely to colleges for reforms or reformers. Colleges, as a general rule, are the last place to which you should look for new ideas, or inspiration to devote one's self to the cause of spiritual and social progress. If one can survive his college life, and come forth into the world with a free mind, an open heart, and power to do the work of a man for his fellow men, he must possess originally a nature of noble constitution, and rare endowments. New ideas are placed in the world by those whom the world knows not, or disowns. Reforms come from the obscure and the unheeded, or from the jeered and the persecuted; a crucified peasant and his fishermen followers; not from the men of Reputation, and Respectability. The weak things of this world are chosen to confound the mighty, and foolish things to bring to nought the wisdom of the wise.

In consequence of this invariable law of Providence, the men who can be placed at the head of these Normal Schools, if established, will not be men who represent the true idea of our institutions, or who will prepare their pupils to come forth educators of our children for the accomplishment of the real destiny of American society. Their teachings and influences, so far as they amount to anything, will be far from such as are needed. They will not make their pupils living men, bold to conceive and strong to effect a good as yet unrealized. They will be instant in season and out of season, to teach them to respect and preserve what is, to caution them against the licentiousness of the people, the turbulence and brutality of the mob, the dangers of anarchy, and even of liberty; but they will rarely seek to imbue them with a love of liberty,

to admonish them to resist the first encroachments of tyranny, to stand fast in their freedom, and to feel always that it is nobler to die, nay, nobler to kill, than to live a slave. They will but echo the sentiments of that portion of the community, on whom they are the more immediately dependent, and they will approve no reform, no step onward, till it has been already achieved in the soul of the community.

We confess, therefore, that we cannot look for much to meet the educational wants of the community, from the favorite measures of the Massachusetts Board of Education. In the view of this respectable Board, education is merely a branch of general police, and schoolmasters are only a better sort of constables. The Board would promote education, they would even make it universal, because they esteem it the most effectual means possible of checking pauperism and crime, and making the rich secure in their possessions. Education has, therefore, a certain utility which may be told in solid cash saved to the Commonwealth. This being the leading idea, the most comprehensive view which the Board seem to take of education, what more should be expected from their labors, than such modifications and improvements as will render it more efficient as an arm of general police? More, we confess, we do not look for from their exertions. The Board is not composed of men likely to attempt more, and if it were composed of other men, with far other, and more elevated and comprehensive views, more could not be effected. Boards of trade may do something, but boards of education and boards of religion are worthy of our respect, only in proportion to their imbecility. To educate a human being to be a man, to fulfil his destiny, to attain the end for which God made him, is not a matter which can, in the nature of things, come within the jurisdiction of a Board, however judiciously it may be constituted.

Nevertheless, the Board may, perhaps, do something. There is room to hope that it will do something to improve the construction of school-houses,

and to collect the material facts concerning the state of education as it now is; and, judging from the accompanying Report of its accomplished Secretary, it may also effect some progress in the methods of teaching our children to spell. This will be considerable, and will deserve gratitude and reward. But, notwithstanding this, we must still adhere to our opinion, that the Board will do nought to increase or improve the facilities which already exist for acquiring an education, in the only sense in which education is of much value; because of education in this sense it has no conception, and no power to labor for it, even if it had the conception. No system of education, no system of schools, which can be instituted and sustained by government, can be adequate to the educational wants of the community. Nothing desirable in matters of education, beyond what relates to the finances of the schools, comes within the province of the legislature. More than this the legislature should not attempt; more than this the friends of education should not ask. Let the legislature provide ample funds for the support of as many schools as are needed for the best education possible of all the children of the community, and there let it stop. The selection of teachers, the choice of studies, and of books to be read or studied, all that pertains to the methods of teaching, and the matters to be taught or learned, are best left to the School District. In these matters, the District should be paramount to the State. The evils we have alluded to are in some degree inseparable from all possible systems of education, which are capable of being put into practice; but they will be best avoided by placing the individual school under the control of a community composed merely of the number of families having children to be educated in it.

For ourselves, we adopt the democratic principle in its fullest extent; but we believe that Federalism — we use the word in its etymological sense — is the method by which its beneficial working is best to be se-

cured. The individual State, as well as the Union, should be a confederacy of distinct communities. Our idea of the true form of a republican government for this country is, 1st, that the few material interests common to all parts of the whole country, should be confided to a General Congress, composed of delegates from all the States; 2dly, that the class of interests, under these, common to the largest extent of territory, should be confided to a State Congress, composed of delegates from Counties; 3dly, the next more general class of interests under these, should be confided to a County Government, composed of delegates from the several Townships, or Wards; 4thly, the next most general class to a Township or Ward government, composed of delegates from the several Districts of the town or ward; 5thly, the remaining interests, which may be subjected to governmental action, should be confided to all the citizens of the District, which should always be of size sufficient to maintain a Grammar School. This is nothing but the actual idea of our government, freed from its exceptions and anomalies, and would require no new divisions to be introduced. Our legislature, in this Commonwealth, is composed of delegates from corporations, or communities, and we hope the hand of innovation will never succeed in giving it a different basis. We would, if we could, revive the old practice of each corporation's paying its own delegates; and we think it would have been an improvement in the constitution of the United States, if the members of Congress, instead of receiving their pay from the Federal Treasury, had been left to receive it from their respective States.

Now, to the smallest of these divisions, corresponding to our present school districts, among other matters, we would confide the whole subject, — with the exception heretofore made, — of common school education. This exception relates to the finances; but we would make even this exception as narrow as possible. The more exclusively the whole matter of the school is brought under the control of the families

specially interested in it, the more efficient will the school be. If the town manage part of it, and the state a part of it, the district will be very likely to be remiss in managing its part, and so in fact no part, in the end, will be well managed. This results from a common principle. Where responsibility is divided, there is always a greater or less want of fidelity in its discharge. Wherever there is a power to be exercised, there should always be a concentration of it in as few hands as possible; and, to counterbalance the centralizing tendency of this, the community should be so divided into sub-communities, that the power should in fact affect but a small number, and matters should be so arranged that this small number should be able to obtain speedy redress, if wronged. We would have as little government as possible; but where we must have government, we would have it lodged in few hands, and empowered to speak in a tone of absolute authority. Experience, we think, bears ample testimony to the soundness of this principle. At any rate, experience proves, that when the powers of the school district were greater, and the interference of the state and the township were less than now, the common school was altogether better than it is at present. In this view of the case, we regard the Board of Education as an unwise establishment. It is a measure designed to reduce yet lower the powers and responsibilities of school districts, to deprive them of their rights, and to bring the whole matter of education under the control of one central government, controlling it in the nature of the case for the children of others, not for their own. In the District, we manage the school for our own children, but the Board of Education have no children in the district school. They are removed to a great distance from it, by the fewness of their number, and the populousness of the community for which they act, and can never take the deep interest of parents in each individual school, and, therefore, must want that which has thus far given to the common school its charm and

its efficiency. To confide our common schools to the Board, is like taking the children from their parents, and entrusting them to strangers. I want no Board of Education to dictate to me concerning the education of my children, and cannot every father say the same? But the Board owes its origin to the warm interest which our community takes in the subject of education, and it is supported, because it is thought that it may give more efficiency to our common school system, and elevate its character. Well will it be for us, if we discover our mistake before it is too late, before we have parted with that system of common schools, which we hold as one of the richest of the legacies left us by our pilgrim fathers.

But, having disposed of the Board of Education, and its Secretary, it is time to return to the question, How is the education we have described to be furnished, in what schools, and under what schoolmasters? This question is a grave one, and deserves a more extended answer than we have the space or the ability to give it. We can do little more than throw out a few loose hints, which, perhaps, may not be without result.

In the first place, we remark, that the education we contend for, as may be guessed from what has already been said, we do not look for from any system of government schools. Government is not in this country, and cannot be, the educator of the people. In education, as in religion, we must rely mainly on the voluntary system. If this be an evil, it is an evil inseparable from our form of government. Government here must be restricted to material interests, and forbidden to concern itself with what belongs to the spiritual culture of the community. It has of right no control over our opinions, literary, moral, political, philosophical, or religious. Its province is to reflect, not to lead, nor to create the general will. It, therefore, must not be installed the educator of the people.

In the second place, we would also remark, that education, in the sense in which we have commended

it, can be only approached, not perfectly realized. To impart an education, answering to the idea we entertain of it, we should need a knowledge far surpassing what mortals can attain to, and resources which superior beings, and only superior beings, can be supposed to possess. But this should not discourage us. If we could not take in an ideal beyond what is actualized, if we had no powers of conception, which outrun our powers of execution, we should not be progressive beings. Our life consists in struggling after the Unattained, and even the Unattainable. The artist attains to excellence, not so much by realizing his ideal, as by struggling to realize an ideal which he cannot. The greatest excellence of a work of art does not lie so much in what it actually embodies, as in its dim revelations of a beauty or a worth the artist struggled after, saw in his soul, but could not seize, embody in his song, transfer to the canvas, or breathe over the marble. So all greatness is enhanced by the conception it always gives of a greater yet beyond, which does not appear. In accordance with this law, in all our doing, we should have an ideal which is above and beyond all that we can do, — an ideal, which haunts us day and night, forbidding us to be satisfied with anything achieved, and compelling us to be ever putting ourselves forth in new and stronger efforts. Grant, then, that the education we contend for cannot be wholly realized. Still, by effort, we of this generation can realize somewhat, which will be so much stock in advance for our successors, who, in their turn, may realize somewhat more.

No system of schools which can be devised can supply this education, because there can be no more knowledge and wisdom embodied in schools, than is already in the community, and because chiefly, the education which our schools can furnish, in their best organization, is the smallest part of the education we do and must receive. The influences which go out from the school-room are weak in comparison with the general influences of society, of Nature, and of Provi-

dence, which are constantly acting upon us. Shut up your school-houses, and in all essential matters your children would grow up about the same, they would were they open. This is a consideration which it is not wise to overlook. No matter what your schools are, the characters of your children will be determined by that intangible, invisible, indescribable, but very real personage, called the Spirit of the Age.

But, pass over all this. If there be education, there must needs be educators. The character of the educators will determine the character of the education. The greatest care, then, belongs to educators, our greatest concernment must be to seek out or rear up well qualified teachers. This, we suppose, is the conviction of all those, who are interested in Normal Schools. Hence their efforts and contributions to their establishment. Yet, not in Normal Schools are we to look for educators, since it may be as difficult to find good teachers for Normal Schools as for any other schools, and since school teachers, in the technical sense, are by no means the real educators of the community.

The real educators of the young are the grown-up generation. The rising generation will always receive as good, as thorough an education as the actual generation is prepared to give, and no better. The great work, then, which needs to be done in order to advance education, is to qualify the actual generation for imparting a more complete and finished education to its successor, that is to say, educate not the young, but the grown-up generation. This educating of the grown-up generation is what we mean by the EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE. Society at large must be regarded as a vast Normal School, in which the whole active, doing, and driving generation of the day are pupils, qualifying themselves to educate the young. Our question now changes its aspect, and becomes, How, by what means, may the education of the grown-up generation be advanced? It will be seen, from this form of the question, that we regard the improvement

of the adult as the means of advancing the child, rather than the education of the child as the means of advancing the adult. We shall probably be told, that in this we put the cart before the horse; but we respectfully suggest whether it be not possible that they, who may be disposed to tell us so, have not made the slight mistake of deeming the horse a cart, and the cart a horse? Verily, to our eyes, their horse looks to us as much like a cart, as Lord Peter's shoulder of mutton did like a twopenny brown loaf to his hungry brothers, whom he had invited to dinner.

What, then, are the means at our disposal for educating the grown-up generation? We can specify but a few, and as in duty bound, both professionally and otherwise, we begin with the clergy, who are really, did they but know it, *ex officio*, educators of the people. The true idea of the Christian Ministry is that of an institution, designed expressly for the education of the people, and it is to the profound sentiment which mankind have of the vast importance of an institution for this purpose, that the Christian ministry is indebted for its origin and support. To the education of the people this ministry in all lands has contributed not a little. Faults, doubtless, the clergy have had, faults they doubtless still have, but there is as little justice as religion in the general condemnation of them, indulged in by but too many of our professed Liberals. If the clergy have been less successful educators of the people than they might have been, it has in some measure been owing to two mistakes, into which they have fallen, in regard to the nature of the clerical office. Affected by reminiscences of Jewish and Pagan priesthoods, the Christian clergy have too often regarded themselves as priests, standing as mediators between God and men. They have felt that it was their peculiar province to offer up prayers and supplications in behalf of the people, and to make intercession for them with the common Father of all. But they should have borne in mind that there is but one mediator between God and men, Jesus Christ, who gave

himself a ransom for all, and, therefore, that no man has any occasion to seek a priest to mediate between him and the Father, to offer up prayers for him in a particular place, because it is now proper for all men to pray themselves wherever they may be, or whatever their profession, "lifting up holy hands without wrath, or doubting." Also should they have borne in mind that a priest, to present the offerings of the people, and to superintend the sacrifice, has become unnecessary, since Christ has appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself as a sin-offering. No priest is now needed to enter into the Holy of Holies to obtain judgment for the people, because one is our High Priest, even Jesus Christ the righteous, who hath entered into the Holy of Holies, not made with hands, but into the heavens themselves, and seated himself at the right hand of the Majesty on high, where he ever liveth to make intercession for us. When the veil of the temple was rent in twain, and the Holy of Holies laid open to the gaze of the multitude, when Jesus exclaimed, "It is finished," bowed his head, and gave up the ghost, as a sin-offering for Humanity, sufficient for all time, and for every man, the old priestly office was abolished. Henceforth, if any man sinned, he was not to go to his priest with a lamb, a he-goat, or with fruits and flowers, but to bear in mind that his advocate with the Father is he, who gave himself to death, that he might be the propitiation for the sins of the whole world. The Christian clergy have not always kept this distinctly in view. They have at times felt that they were priests, to a certain extent, in the old sense of the word. Hence a chief cause of the errors they have committed, and of the opposition they have in modern times encountered.

Another mistake, into which the clergy have fallen, and which grows out of the one already mentioned, is that of supposing it their province not merely to discourse on the destiny of man, but to discourse on it dogmatically, to insist on it, that their solution of the problem of human destiny shall be

taken as final, as the only true solution, and that another cannot be entertained, nor even sought after without sin. The clergyman has, in fact, no authority to preach beyond that which his teachings carry in themselves. He speaks to men, who, if they be his equals in intelligence, have the same right to command him, that he has to command them. When he placed himself in a high pulpit, above the people, from which he was to command the people what to believe, he forgot his true position, and encroached on the prerogative of Jesus. He assumed to be lord and master, where he was in truth only a brother, and should have wished only to be a servant. Much evil has resulted from this assumption. But the assumption has now become ridiculous. Knowledge is no longer the exclusive possession of the clergy; their monopoly has been broken up; and it is no rare thing to find their superiors, even in theological matters, in the ranks of the laity. The day for authoritative teaching is gone by. Instead of enjoining and enforcing, the clergy, willingly or not, must hereafter labor to explain and convince. They have no longer any anathemas to fulminate; their quiver is exhausted of its thunderbolts, and their heads can no longer bear the triple crown. They must henceforth speak as men to their equals, and subject what they utter to the free action of reason, which all men possess in common.

Correcting these two mistakes, the clergy may contribute much to the education of the people. Freed from these two false notions, the Christian Ministry will survive all the mutations of time, all changes in men's creeds, social institutions, and arrangements. There is a deep and permanent necessity for its continuance, in the nature of man and the will of Providence. No institution can ever wholly supersede it, or take its place. It must last as long as man lasts. Let the clergy, then, understand their mission. They are set apart as special educators of the people. They should, then, study attentively the nature of man and society, and arrive as nearly as they can at the true solution of the problem of both.

Some, we are aware, will start at our doctrine, and ask us, if we would have clergymen meddle with politics. They will tell us that clergymen belong to the kingdom of God, that their kingdom is not of this world, and that, therefore, they should keep clear of the field of politics. This is more specious than solid. All man's duties are intimately connected, and there is, and there can be, no such separation between religion and politics, as the doctrine opposed to ours implies. Religion and politics run perpetually into one another. A religion which neglects man's social weal, is defective in the extreme; and politics separated from religion are not only defective, but mischievous, degenerating of necessity into Machiavelism. Politics, rightly understood, are nothing but the great principles of Christianity applied to our social relations and arrangements, and are, therefore, as much within the legitimate province of the clergyman, as are the private and domestic virtues. On neither politics nor religion do we ask of the clergy dogmatic instructions, for they are but men, and often as ignorant as the rest of us of the true solution of the problem of our destiny. What we ask of them is, that they direct our minds to the problem of society, as well as to that of the salvation of the individual, and that they enter, in their public communications, into its free and full discussion. This they ought to do, did they contemplate only the salvation of the individual in the world after death. The sinner is saved only by being redeemed from all sin, and we know no reason why sins against society should not be as impassable barriers to salvation, as sins against the Church, or against individuals. Man's whole nature must be developed and perfected, in order to fit him for heaven, and the social element is as much an element, as essential an element of his nature, as the religious. All error is more or less prejudicial, and we know not why error in relation to the problem of the destiny of society should be thought less prejudicial to the growth and perfection of the soul, than error in

relation to the destiny of man, as an individual, or simple human being. We say, then, let the pulpit be opened to all subjects of general and permanent interest. Let it speak a free, bold, and earnest voice, and not fear to grapple with the weightiest problems, only let it speak to free men, or to men who have, at least, the right to be free men.

We are aware of the usual objection made to the interference of clergymen in political matters. He may give offence, may disturb the harmony of his parish, and diminish his means of usefulness. Be it so. We are never afraid of giving offence. They, whom the free, bold, and earnest utterance of one's honest convictions on any subject of importance can offend, deserve to be offended, and it would be criminal to please them. The harmony of a parish, which would be disturbed by the kind of preaching we demand, ought to be disturbed, for it is a deceitful harmony. Peace is a good thing, but justice is better. We would rather have war, and war to the knife, than a hollow peace, founded on the sacrifice of truth, or duty. Suppose, then, that the kind of preaching we call for should disturb, should agitate, nay, should to some extent call forth angry feelings, better so than the present deadness of our Churches. Give us the noise and contention of life, rather than the peace and silence of the charnel-house. Men live in the storm, in the tempest, where they must put forth all their efforts, and use all their wits to keep above water, not in the calm, rocking on a tideless and rotting ocean. Whoso would live and be a man, should joy to snuff the battle from afar, and leap to rush in where blows fall thickest and fall heaviest. Nothing is so much to be dreaded as that calm, respectable state, which our respectable clergy contend for. Be cold or be hot, not lukewarm, lest the Almighty spue thee out of his mouth. Let the clergy, then, preach on politics. If they give offence, they may be sure that they have preached on the subject they should. If they stir up commotion, let them "thank God and take courage,"

for they have at length found out one subject, at least, in which their congregations take an interest.

Next to the pulpit, in this country, as a means of educating the people, we mention the Lyceum, under which general term we include, not only the associations called Lyceums, but the popular Lectures, scientific or otherwise, which are beginning to be so frequent, and so fashionable. The Lyceum is as yet in its infancy. We cannot say much for its actual performances thus far; but it possesses a capacity, which, when fully developed, will make it an institution of immense power. It has grown up from the feeling of the age and country of the necessity of greater exertions for the education of the people, and to the education of the people, we believe it destined to contribute not a little.

The Lyceum has hitherto done not much, because it has discussed topics too remotely connected with life, its hopes and affections, trials and duties. It has dealt with facts, rather than with ideas, with physical science, rather than with moral and intellectual philosophy. Facts gratify to a certain extent our curiosity, and fill our memories, but taken disjoined from the principles which unite and enlighten them, they make us no wiser, nor more knowing. There are deeper wants in most men than curiosity, and somewhat beside the memory to be filled. Ideas interest the people more than mere facts, and appeal to far deeper and more enduring wants. Whoso would take a firm hold of the popular heart, must speak on great and everlasting principles, which lie at the foundation of all science, and which come into play in every day life. You may please a popular audience by a lecture on bugs, or fishes, by a description of St. Peter's, or York Minster, by the details of the battle of Agincourt or Poitiers, by discourses on chemistry, astronomy, geology, electricity, but you please them only for a moment. You give them a few facts to be remembered, not great principles, to be used. You have gratified curiosity, but you have furnished few materials for

thought. You have not awakened the mind, and set it at work.

There is a great mistake in our age and country on this subject, growing very naturally out of our infidel tendencies. We believe in matter, not in mind ; in mechanics, but not in ethics ; in geology and chemistry, but not in religion. Hence, the paramount attention we pay to the natural sciences, and our sneers at metaphysics. But, in truth, the natural sciences are little worth without the moral and intellectual. Be never so thoroughly master of all the physical sciences, and you are a fool in all that really concerns men, if you are instructed in nothing else. Religion and politics are the two great concerns of human beings, and in relation to these we are not necessarily instructed at all by the study of physical science. The study of Nature, we are sometimes told, tends to make us religious ; "an undevout astronomer," some fool has said, "is mad ;" just as though there was anything more in the heavenly bodies to convince us of the being of a God, than in the grass that springs up under our feet, or the flowers that bloom along our path. The man who already believes in God will, no doubt, become more devout by the study of astronomy ; but he, who goes to that study without a belief in God, will, however far he may push his researches, find only confirmation of his atheism, and say, in the end, with Lalande, "*Je n'ai jamais vu Dieu au bout de mes lunettes.*" In herself, nature is mute and uninformative. She is to us very much what we make her, and the voice she utters is but the voice we give her. To the religious, she is of a religious tendency ; to the unbeliever, she is a teacher of infidelity. The wisdom you call hers is your own projected, and the beauty you ascribe her is the beauty of your own souls. Strike out the beauty within you, and you shall see none in the starry heavens, none in those sweet flowers you love so well ; none in those distant mountains, with their harmonious outlines, nor in the tranquil ocean, sleeping so gently beneath the moon-

beams which play upon its unruffled bosom. Without the beauty which our own souls project, all nature were to us but an huge, ill-shapen, drab-colored jumble of earth, stones, and water. It is the spirit of God, that breathes out from the soul over the weltering chaos, which brings light out of darkness, order out of confusion, and beauty out of deformity. Nor does the study of the natural sciences tend in the least to solve the political problem. The men whose lives are spent in poring over outward nature, are not the men who will feel the deepest interest in the destiny of society. Was there not an ancient mathematician, who was found quietly solving some mathematical problem, while the enemy were battering down the walls of his native city, and butchering or leading captive his countrymen? Tyrants have no dread of the physical sciences. When your Napoleons remodel French Institutes, they preserve the classes devoted to natural science, and exclude only the class devoted to moral and political science; exile your De Staëls, but patronize your Cuviers. They have no dread of the facts of external nature. The disclosure of these facts throws no dangerous light on the worth of the soul, and the rights of man. It tells the people nothing of their wrongs, nothing of the manner in which they have been cheated, nor that they are regarded by the government only as a sort of tax-paying animals, useful in proportion to the amount of taxes they pay with the least drawback in police expenditures for the purpose of keeping them in order. People may dig into the bowels of the earth, they may speculate on the revolutions of the globe, and seek to reconstruct from a few fossil remains the huge animals of an earlier time. This shakes no throne, changes no dynasty, and makes no absolute monarch feel insecure. But let them once become busy with the problem of society, let them once attempt to investigate the foundations of the actually existing society, and to search into the manner in which the world is governed, and for whose benefit, and forthwith the tyrant

turns pale, absolute kings stand aghast, hierarchies give way, nobilities fall, and there is heard a sound as the "crack of doom." The people indignant rise, and swear that they are, and will be men; and wo to whomsoever dare gainsay them.

The physical sciences may be studied under any form of society, and they can adapt themselves to the service of the tyrant, as well as the father of the people. They necessarily involve no social revolution. But with ideas the case stands different. The study of the moral and intellectual sciences, necessarily brings up the great religious and social problems, and acts directly on existing social relations. All who fear the people and distrust the democracy, encourage them as little as possible. To this fact we supposed it was owing, that our Cambridge University was for so many years without a professor in the moral and political sciences; and it is not one of the least encouraging signs of the times, that it has finally been forced to fill the long vacant chair, and with a man, too, from whom the public may hope somewhat. It proves that a confidence in the people, and in popular institutions, is beginning to find its way into old Harvard. Who can henceforth doubt the triumph of democracy?

Whoever would act on the masses, produce changes for good or for evil, must deal, not with facts merely, but with ideas, and the profounder and the more universal the ideas he puts forth, the greater shall be his power, the more wide and lasting his influence. Who-so has an idea is always a king and a priest. Ideas work all the revolutions which affect the moral and political world. One day in an humble town of a mountainous district in Lesser Asia, an obscure carpenter's son stands up in the synagogue, and reads, "The spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor; he hath sent me to heal the broken-hearted, to preach deliverance to captives, and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that are bruised, to preach the acceptable year of the Lord," and the veil of the tem-

ple is rent, idols and idol-worships pass away, and the whole moral and political world is changed. Whence this result? The carpenter's son uttered an idea, and that idea has made the world after its own image. An obscure Wittenberg monk, possessed with an idea, is more than a match for the whole religious and political organization of his epoch. Possessed of an idea, a few pilgrims, landing on Plymouth Rock, are able to found an empire, and ensure liberty to the world. Ideas are the sovereigns of the Universe. Whoso would educate the people must do them homage. The Lyceum must represent this truth. Its lectures and discussions should be on subjects connected with what is deepest, and most enduring in human nature. When they shall be so, it will not only add to its interest and popularity, but become one of the most efficient agents desirable in the education of the people. But, it must put away its childish tricks. It must become serious and manly. It must aim higher, and strike deeper. Instead of wasting its strength on questions, such as, Which is the more useful element to man, fire or water, it must bend all its energies to the solution of the problem of human destiny, — to the questions, What is my destiny, as a man? What is the destiny of society? And how may I best fulfil my own destiny, and contribute to the fulfilment of the destiny of society?

One more agent in the education of the people, and only one more, we have space to mention. This agent is the press, by which we mean mainly the periodical press, newspapers, magazines, and reviews. In this sense, the press in modern times has become a power, a sort of "fourth estate," and the most efficient agent in our possession for acting on the opinions of the people. It has, in a great measure, superseded the stage, and to some extent even the pulpit. Whoever has a doctrine to advance, or a measure to carry, writes, or causes to be written, a leading article in a Daily, or an essay in a Quarterly. The increasing number of periodicals, their ever-widening circulation,

owing to the constantly increasing number of readers, make, and must make, for a long time to come, the periodical press, or *journalism*, if you please, the first object of consideration with all who take any interest in the opinions entertained and acted on by the people.

The press must, undoubtedly, to a great extent, reflect public opinion, collect and utter what is already believed and cherished by the public. But it may do more. It has the capacity to be a leader of public opinion, in some degree to originate it, to correct and elevate it. How great this capacity is, it is impossible to say. We have no means of measuring it. But that it exists, cannot be doubted. The great value of the press, as an educator of the people, depends almost entirely on the proper unfolding and exercise of this capacity. The mischief, or inefficiency of the press, hitherto, has consisted in its attempt to follow, rather than lead, public opinion. Editors have inquired *WHAT IS*, rather than, *WHAT OUGHT TO BE*? In this inquiry, too, they have consulted a few individuals, just around them, instead of taking enlarged and comprehensive views of the whole community; and have, therefore, given out as public opinion, what, in fact, was only the opinion of a coterie, a faction, or a few noisy partisans, or sectarians. In this way it happens, often, that party papers do by no means express the real sentiments of their party. Your party paper, again, instead of speaking out honestly what its editor holds to be true or desirable, utters only what the same editor, or his advisers, have concluded to be what the party will be most likely to approve. "That is a noble measure," said one day a distinguished Senator in the State of New York, to the present writer, "and if adopted would be attended with the most beneficial results." "Will you support it in your place, as Senator?" said we. "If it is a measure of my party, I will," was the reply. This is the principle on which party politicians and party editors too often act. The Independent Treasury scheme was originally a Whig measure, and then it

was opposed by the opposing party. It is now advocated by the Democratic party, and all the Whigs oppose it, and in most cases, we apprehend, simply because it is not *now* a measure of *their* party. In this way the press fails, on the one hand, to lead public opinion, and on the other even to reflect it.

It will easily be seen, from these remarks, that we look upon its want of freedom and independence, as the chief cause of the inefficiency of the press as an educator of the people. We call our press free, but, in truth, the press is very little, if any, more free in this country, than it is in the monarchical countries of Europe. There is here a censorship of the press, hardly less paralyzing than that established by Austria and Prussia. The government, to be sure, lets it alone, but in the absence of governmental restraint, each man erects himself into a censor, and if the paper utters an opinion he does not like, he forthwith stops his subscription. The publisher, therefore, finds very soon that he must either pocket his independence, and echo the popular dogma, whatever it may be, or quit publishing, or starve. There is hardly a civilized country on earth, whose literature is so tame and servile as ours has been. Our reviews, in general, take as much pains to avoid the utterance of any new or leading idea, as they would, were they published under the immediate supervision of the Spanish Inquisition, or the Ottoman Porte. Even our favorite North American refuses to utter the truth, when the truth is not of the sort to please its erudite editor. The honest and enlightened contributor to its pages must submit to a censorship altogether more humiliating than would be exacted by a European despot. This the Italian exile, who has fled from Austrian tyranny to enjoy life and freedom in America, can bear witness to, for he has been prohibited from telling the truth, and made to tell what is not true, and what he does not believe to be true. Sorry are we to say such things of the American press, but he is not always the worst patriot, who tells his countrymen of their faults.

If we pass from our periodical press to our regular built books, we shall find still deeper cause to blush and hang our heads. Scarcely a book has ever issued from the American press, that breathes anything like the free spirit we find in French literature, or even in that of Germany. The Anglo-Saxon mind is free enough in what relates to material interests, free enough in all practical matters, but in what relates to the region of ideas, to the higher departments of thought, it is a skeptic, or a slave. Scarcely shall you find a single English or American statesman, that has not a most holy horror of abstract principles, a most prudent detestation of "abstract right." Listen in the Parliament of Great Britain, or in the Congress of the United States, for the free utterance of great principles, or to the attempt to determine the worth of certain measures by considering them in the light of first principles, and you shall listen in vain. The Anglo-Saxon mind conceives nothing of first principles, has no acquaintance with ideas, no faith in mind, and faith only in steam-ships and rail-ways. At least, this has been its predominant character since the "glorious Revolution" of 1688.

This same trait of character appears in our literature. We can easily account for it, and are very far from declaiming against it, or about it. Still it prevents our literature from being what it ought to be. It shows us wherein we are defective, and wherein we should seek to amend. What American writers want is thought, free, deep, earnest thought. This they will not have until they learn to speak out freely what is in them. Man is man, here as well as elsewhere. There is nothing in our heavens, nothing in our lakes and rivers, our mountains and plains, the earth, on which we stand, the scenery, amidst which we are reared, or the food on which we feed, to hinder us from attaining to as lordly a stature of mind or body here as elsewhere. Let man here dare be a man, and a man he shall be, worthy to be the model-man of all ages and countries. He has had here the cour-

age to free himself from kings, nobilities, and hierarchies. Why, then, shall he not have the courage to speak out the rich thoughts the Divinity sends him, to tell without apology or misgiving what comes to him as truth? Shall I be thought the less of if I tell my honest convictions? Shall I feed the worse? be clad in a coarser garb? What then? Am I nothing but what the opinion of others, my food, and my clothing make me? Am I not a man, and not the less a man, whatever be my environment? Shall I bend to popular prejudice? shall I be false to my own soul, — false to all that is true within me, that I may be thought the better of, feed on costlier viands, or wear a finer coat? No. Let me be cast out from the society of men; let me wander the earth in sheep-skins, or in goat-skins; let me dwell alone on the mountain, or in caverns; let me beg, let me starve sooner. When God gave me a manly nature, he bid me be true to it; when he gave me reason, he bid me listen to its oracles, and when he gave me a social nature, and linked me by ties sweet as heaven to my kind, he bid me be true to whatever I should be honestly convinced would be for their good, and let me die, nay, let me sink into eternal torture, sooner than be false to the trust committed to me. This, it strikes us, is the only language becoming a man. Talk not to me of my party or my sect, talk not to me of reputation or of wealth; these are nothing; they can follow me only to the tomb. They cannot make me amends for having been false to my God. They will not quench the eternal fire, which must scorch the tongue which has uttered falsehood, or refused to utter the truth. He, who shrinks from free thought and free speech, is the most abject of slaves, is not a man but a pitiable thing, unworthy of heaven, and too imbecile for hell.

Still, we apprehend, that the American press is needlessly chary of free speech. There is, after all, something in even the Anglo-Saxon, that looks with contempt on the mental slave, and which leaps to behold the brave spirit that snaps his fetters, and stands up a

free man. Policy, interest, craft, may say what they deem expedient against the man who utters new thoughts, unpopular truths in free, bold, and manly tones; but the universal heart of Humanity does him homage, and even they, who are loudest in their censures, do inwardly reverence him. This is as true in this country as in any other; for even the Anglo-Saxon is a man, and the character we have given of his mind is only accidental and temporary. His mind was freer and richer once, and will be again. Nay; even now, all unconsciously, lie concealed within it the nobler elements, which constituted a Milton, a Sidney, and a Hampden. There is good stuff after all in the Anglo-Saxon mind, and whoso dare use it shall be crowned priest and king. There is not so much danger in speaking freely in this country as the conductors of our press apprehend. Our own Review is a proof of it. We say nothing by way of boasting, but this journal has spoken freely, and boldly, and strongly, on subjects of the greatest delicacy. It has uttered, without apology, as unpopular opinions as a man can utter in this country. And what has been the result? So far as the Review has been commended at all, it has been for the very qualities in which we contend the American press is most deficient. What reputation the editor has secured to himself, he has secured by means of the independence, the freedom, and boldness, which have characterized his discussions. The editor, in fact, instead of losing reputation by the course he has pursued in this Review, is almost wholly indebted to it for what little literary reputation may be allowed him. We regard this as a proof that a man may speak out honestly and fearlessly what is in him, without losing reputation, or endangering his success as a writer. In fact, the American public are prepared for discussions altogether freer than the conductors of the press seem to imagine.

Let the American press but assert its freedom, and enter freely and fully into all the great questions we

have raised, and it will do not a little to advance the education of the people. It must be free; it must address itself to the mind of the community, and labor incessantly to quicken thought, and direct it to the solution of the problem of human destiny. It must not dogmatize, must not seek to establish a creed, but to throw what light it can on all questions of interest to man or society, to elicit discussion, and induce the people to find out truth for themselves. It will be well also for the people to bear in mind, that, if they are to have the advantages of a free press, they must tolerate great latitude of discussion, that they must not withhold their support from a periodical because it now and then puts forth an heterodox opinion. Perhaps the periodical's heterodoxy, upon closer examination, may turn out to be wholesome orthodoxy. Who knows? "Prove all things; hold fast that which is good."

These are some of the means which we possess for educating the people. Let these be judiciously and faithfully employed, and it will matter but little what the schools are. The most that can be asked of our schools is simply instruction in the art of reading and writing, and in the positive sciences. To them we may look for instruction, but never should we rely on them for education. The community can never be educated in schools, technically so called; they can be educated only by the free action of mind on mind. Whatever means we have for bringing mind to act on mind, so many means we have for educating the people. Let every man do what is in him to employ these means judiciously and effectively.

ART. II. — *Fragments Philosophiques*, par V. COUSIN.
Troisième édition. 2 Tom. Paris. 1838.

WE do not mean, in the present article, to renew the discussion on the philosophical system of M. Cousin, which has heretofore occupied a large space in the pages of this journal.* The friends of the modern school of Eclecticism in France have abundant reason to be gratified with the reception which its principal doctrines have found in this country. They have arrested the attention of many inquirers. The youthful student has welcomed them as leading to a higher eminence, commanding a more extensive and varied prospect, and surrounded by a more elastic and refreshing atmosphere, than the popular theories of English Sensualism; while the politician and theologian have begun to look into their influence, and either to claim their support, or to attempt their refutation. This is precisely what the lover of science could wish. A passive adhesion to the new French philosophy were little better than a dogged attachment to ancient traditions. We value speculative science, indeed, not merely on account of the truth which it imparts, but, perhaps, still more, for the mental freedom which it calls forth, the spring which it gives to the boldest inquiry, and the scorn which it pours on every idea, which has no plea but that of prescription to the place it occupies. Such an impulse has been communicated, in no small degree, to a numerous circle of minds, by the eloquent writings of M. Cousin; they have spread fear in many high places; the usual portion of reproach and misrepresentation has been administered to them; but still they are studied with more interest than any philosophical system we are acquainted with; they are scattered far and wide over the land, in some of the various forms, in which they have been presented, or

[* This article is from the pen of a contributor.]

reproduced. Neither our churches, nor our elections, are entirely beyond the reach of their influence; and if a sound and masculine philosophy is to be infused into the spirit of our countrymen, all present signs indicate that it will be one, which traces its nativity to Paris, though of Teutonic origin, rather than to Athens, Königsberg, or London.

We propose merely to lay before our readers a few extracts from the original articles in this edition of the *Fragments*, which we think cannot fail to gratify them; and their gratification shall be increased by our abstaining almost entirely from any comments of our own.

The first volume of this edition is introduced by a long advertisement, which is well worth translating. We will give copious selections from this, as it is more important to the student than anything in the book. At the same time, it contains a spice of the harmless egotism, with a plenty of the literary details, not to say gossip, which M. Cousin, now and then, mixes up with more serious matters.

M. Cousin thus refers to the controversy which was excited by the edition of 1833.

"This controversy left the previous one far behind it; it entered more deeply into the heart of the subject; and, among other advantages, it designated with more precision the character of the new French philosophy, and its position in the midst of other contemporary schools.

"In Germany, M. Amadeus Wendt, the continuator of Tenneman, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Göttingen, in whose decease the history of philosophy has just suffered a severe loss, published an elaborate review of the second edition of the *Fragments*.*

"M. Bekkers, Professor of Philosophy at the Lyceum of Dillingen, in Bavaria, has done me the honor of translating the Preface; and M. Schelling has been pleased to introduce me to the German public, by prefixing a few pages to the translation of M. Bekkers, in which he expresses his opinion on the several points which I have treated, with his characteristic

* *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen*, 22 Sept. 1834. This article was translated in the *Revue Germanique* for Sept. 1834.

clearness and vigor.* This little production, as it broke the silence which the author of the *Philosophy of Nature* had preserved for many years, was quite an important event for science; and if my work did nothing else for philosophy than give occasion to this, I must rejoice in its publication.

“For the rest, it is not to be supposed, that either the article of M. Wendt, or that of M. Schelling, was a hymn to my praise; far from it. M. Schelling, as well as M. Wendt, while he did justice to my designs and my endeavors, and, within certain limits, approved the systematic conclusions, to which I had arrived, does not hesitate to condemn the path which I have followed, namely, the psychological method. He expressly asserts, that, though psychology may be a preparation, more or less useful for philosophy, it is not the foundation of it, and that observation applied to the consciousness can perceive, after all, even in the most elevated region, only the facts of consciousness, notions, universal and necessary principles, if you please, but purely formal and subjective, from which it is impossible to derive anything objective and real. In the opinion of Schelling, metaphysics is not a chimera; man, enlightened by a divine ray, has been endowed with the privilege of knowing the truth, and the real system of beings; and my illustrious friend agrees with me in seeking this system, in aspiring after this noble end; but he declares that psychology is absolutely unable to conduct to it; in a word, he approves the end, while he disapproves the means.”

M. Cousin has paid great attention to the course of literature and education in the United States. His account of the reception of his own philosophy in this country seems to be very accurate. He does not overrate the attention it has excited, nor the objections that have been brought against it, even by some who are disposed to make a highly favorable estimate of its general character. We are glad to perceive that he places Edwards in the elevated rank to which he is

* *Victor Cousin über französische und deutsche Philosophie*, von Dr. Hubert Bekkers; Vorrede von Schelling. Stuttgart und Tübingen 1834. There are two French translations of M. Schelling's Preface; one by M. Ravaisson, inserted in the *Revue Germanique*, for Oct. 1835; the other, entitled *Jugement de M. de Schelling sur la philosophie de M. Cousin*, translated from the German, and preceded by an *Essai sur la nationalité des philosophies*, par J. Wilm, Strasbourg et Paris, 1835.

entitled, as one of the ripest, most independent, and most original minds which have been matured on the soil of New-England. While Franklin honorably represents the material element in American cultivation, let it be the praise of Jonathan Edwards, that, like Plato, Milton, Leibnitz, and Fenelon, he cherished "the love of divine things for the beauty of their moral qualities," and sought a philosophical reconciliation between the doctrines of revelation, in the Scriptures, the decrees of Providence in the course of history, and the voice of God in the human soul.

"At the other extremity of the civilized world, on the other side of the Atlantic, the *Fragments* have met with a still more favorable reception than in Germany. While my writings on Education, thanks to the beautiful translation of Mrs. Austin, have been widely spread in the United States, sometimes under the direction of the public authority,* the *Fragments* connected with my Lectures have founded, without my knowledge, a philosophical school, in the country of Jonathan Edwards and Franklin. In 1832 and 1834, Mr. Linberg† and Mr. Henry‡ translated my Lectures; and while I am now writing, Mr. Ripley has just placed the second Preface of the *Fragments*, with several other articles of mine, at the head of his *Philosophical Miscellanies*,§ taken exclusively from French writers. In 1836 and 1837, Mr. Brownson|| published a defence of my principles, displaying a power of thought and expression, which, completely developed, promises to America a philosophical writer of the first order. But is it asked, what recommends the new French philosophy at New-York, and Boston? I answer, besides its moral and religious character, its method, that psychological method which almost calls forth a smile from

* *Report on the State of Public Instruction in Prussia*, translated by S. Austin. London, 1834.

† *Introduction to the History of Philosophy*, translated by H. G. Linberg. Boston, 1832.

‡ *Elements of Psychology, included in a Critical Examination of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding*, translated by C. S. Henry, with an Introduction, Notes, and Additions. Hartford, 1834.

§ *Philosophical Miscellanies*, translated from the French of Cousin, Jouffroy, and B. Constant, with Introductory and Critical Notices, by G. Ripley. 2 vols. Boston, 1838.

|| *The Christian Examiner*, Sept. 1836. *Cousin's Philosophy*. 1b. May, 1837. *Recent Contributions to Philosophy*.

the President of the Royal Academy at Munich. Still further, as soon as this method passes over certain limits, rises to a certain elevation, the most energetic thinkers follow it with difficulty,* and recoil before the scientific conclusions, which, in Germany, produced not the least hesitation, and are admitted as a matter of course. Philosophy in America is, to a certain extent, under the influence of the article in the "Edinburgh Review" for 1829, an article of singular merit, and which places its author in a high rank; but the conclusion of which, a little disguised, is, that psychology and logic are the only parts of philosophy that are certain, while beyond this point we can only acknowledge our ignorance and doubt."

The following reference is made to the introduction of Eclecticism into Italy, accompanied with the general remarks, which we subjoin.

"I should be ungrateful towards Italy, if I did not here publicly express my acknowledgments to the most celebrated of its professors. M. Galuppi, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Naples, who, after introducing Kant into the country of Vico and Genovesi, has condescended to give a translation of the *Fragments* from his own pen. Another writer of great ability, M. Mancino, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Palermo, has naturalized Eclecticism in Sicily; while at the other extremity of the Italian peninsula, M. Poli, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Padua, and the ingenious and often profound Abbe Rosmini, the one with an almost entire agreement, the other with a severe, though always friendly, criticism, have directed attention to the new philosophy.

"I merely state facts, without discussing them. I mention the most remarkable productions which the last edition of the *Fragments* has occasioned, but refrain from expressing any judgment in regard to their character. Certainly the controversy, which has commenced on the nature and kinds of the philosophic method, will not cease immediately; it is henceforth attached to the very movement of philosophy in our age. Every important system will necessarily reproduce it, and, some time or other, the occasion will be present-

* See in the *Boston Quarterly Review*, 1838, No. I., an article by Mr. Brownson, *Philosophy and Common Sense*, in reply to an article in the *Christian Examiner*, Nov. 1837, entitled *Locke and the Transcendentalists*.

ed of taking part in my turn, and of replying, at my leisure, to the objections which have been brought against me from different quarters of the philosophical world. I can at least declare, that these objections have not weakened my conviction, and that time will show how easily they may be made to refute each other. To my adversaries I should only have to oppose my adversaries themselves ; and if they will consent to be represented for a moment by M. Schelling and M. Hamilton, that is to say, by the first thinker and the first critic of our age, I would address to them, in anticipation, with perfect confidence, this short and simple reply.

“To Germany and to M. Schelling, I would say ; to your proud disdain of the psychologic method allow me to oppose the authority of M. Hamilton, and of all my adversaries. If this authority be not sufficient, I will add that of three individuals, whom you may believe entitled to some weight ; these are Socrates, Descartes, and Kant, the father of German philosophy ; to say nothing of Fichte and Jacobi ; for, I may say in passing, before the appearance of the *Philosophy of Nature*, the excellence of the psychologic method was as little disputed in Germany as it still is in every other country.

“And what do you substitute in place of this method ? Once, at least, it was intellectual intuition. But one of two things is true ; either intellectual intuition falls under the eye of consciousness, or it does not. If it does not, how do you know anything about it ? Who has revealed to you its marvellous existence ? By what right do you speak of it ? If it does fall under the eye of consciousness, we are brought back to psychology, and I refer you to your own objections.

“These may be summed up in the following argument. Psychology cannot conduct to metaphysics, to real objects, to existences ; for it does not pass beyond the limits of consciousness ; and everything involved in consciousness is purely subjective. Here, then, is this formidable principle. But this principle is only an assertion ; where is its proof ? According to my theory, it is reason which directly knows the truth, and not only abstract truths, universal and necessary principles, but real objects, existences. The question is, whether this power of reason is less legitimate because it falls under the eye of consciousness. Now, who has demonstrated that consciousness does not merely contemplate the objects of its view, but that it possesses the surprising faculty of metamorphosing them with its magic look, and of imposing on them its own nature ? In that case, all truth is forever subjective ; for no truth can be known, except by a mind which is conscious of it. If, by

reason of this fact alone, it is subjective, the objective character of knowledge is an extravagance, a chimera ; for it forms a problem, the conditions of which are equally necessary and contradictory ; this problem, in reality, demands a mind, which knows the truth, and at the same time, it demands, that this mind should not know, that it knows it ; but this is a contradiction. The Deity himself knows things only in knowing that he knows them ; the consciousness of his knowledge would accordingly be to him an insurmountable barrier, separating him forever from real knowledge. All this is not serious. It must either be maintained that reason in itself is incapable of knowing beings, or if this is not pretended, through fear of destroying all philosophy at its root, we must admit that reason is not liable to the charge of impotence, because it acts under the eye of our consciousness. It does not change its nature, on account of this fact ; it does not lose the divine force which is in it, nor the wings which it has received, in order to attain to the knowledge of beings, and to rise even to that being from whom it emanates. Consciousness attests this sublime development of reason ; it does not create it ; nor does it possess the power to alter its character.

“ And, moreover, to what God does Schelling now aspire ? Is it the abstraction of being, which I took the liberty to speak of somewhat lightly, with all the respect which I owe, and which I bear to the memory of Hegel ? By no means. Is it the absolute identity of subject and object, as maintained in the Philosophy of Nature ? Not at all. The God of Schelling is the free and spiritual God of Christianity. I rejoice in this with all my heart ; but what better guide can we have in this new path than the profound study of the free and intelligent being, whom God has made in his own image, and endowed with characteristics, which we cannot recognise in man, without finding them in their first cause, expanded and enlarged with all the greatness of the Infinite Being ? If Spinoza had perceived that activity and liberty are essential attributes of man, he would not have deprived God of every similar attribute ; and his God would not have been merely a substance, but a cause, — a cause, I mean, worthy of the name. The knowledge of God completes the knowledge of man ; but the knowledge of man commences the true knowledge of God. Do not, then, despise a method, which leads to such results.

“ One word now to M. Hamilton, and to my adversaries in Scotland and America.

“ You admit the psychological method as the true method of philosophy. You glory in it ; but you are not sure that this

method conducts legitimately to ontology ; and, instead of sacrificing psychology to ontology, like Germany and M. Schelling, it is the latter, which you sacrifice to the former ; with the modesty of science, you choose to dispense with ontology ; you advise me to do the same, and to renounce the attempt to know what is beyond the reach of the human mind. But what do you say ? Let us not be afraid of words. Ontology is nothing less than the science of being, that is to say, in reality, of beings, that is to say, of God, of the world, and of man. Here, then, is what you require me to renounce by your scruples in regard to method. But, if your science attains neither the knowledge of God, of nature, nor of myself, what can I gain from learning it ?

“ To the contemners of the psychological method, I just opposed the great names of Socrates, Descartes, and Kant. To its exclusive partisans, I now oppose the no less mighty names of Plato, Aristotle, and Leibnitz, and this same German philosophy which now counts nearly half a century of duration and progress ; and which is incontestably at the head of all modern philosophy, since Cartesianism. All great philosophical systems have announced positive doctrines. What would their immortal authors have said, if it had been announced to them that their sublime labors concerning the universe and God were idle speculation, and that philosophy should confine itself to the analysis of memory or of attention ? To the authority of genius, I add another, of still greater value, — that of common sense, and of the human race. The human race, without allowing its boundless wants and its powerful instincts to be shackled by artificial restraints, — does it not know its own existence, that of the world which it inhabits, and finally, that of the Supreme Invisible Intelligence, who is everywhere present beneath the veil of the Universe ? Such is the faith of the human race. I shall never cease to repeat, that the purpose of philosophy is, not to destroy this faith, but to explain it. Every system of philosophy, which remains behind the natural faith of the human race, pronounces its own condemnation, and declares of itself that its wisdom is but folly ; for there is no true wisdom in separating ourselves from our kind, whether we remain below or rise above the unanimous convictions of the human family.

“ I might go still further ; I might demonstrate, that in fearing to advance into the world of existences, in stopping with the exterior of consciousness, we are deceived, if we suppose that we have gained a firm and solid, though limited foothold. By no means. A sound logic does not leave this asylum to the

exclusive partisans of psychology. In fact, if reason, as they maintain, cannot give the knowledge of beings with certainty, how does it gain the certainty, the absolute validity, of which it is supposed to be destitute, when it applies itself to phenomena, to those of consciousness, for instance? In both cases, the question is to know, and it is the same faculty which knows. How then do phenomena obtain the privilege of establishing a certain knowledge? What foundation is there for the belief, that these phenomena have a real existence, that all this is not a dream? Properly speaking, we ought also to doubt the reality of the phenomena of consciousness, that is to say, the reality of our own thought, the reality even of our doubt. Reason, sure of itself, may admit doubt on certain points, on which it affirms that as yet it ought to affirm nothing. But what can control doubt, when it bears on the very foundation of intellectual and moral life, on the authority and veracity of reason, the only principle of all certainty, of all truth, of all light, beyond the sphere of consciousness, as well as within it? It is in this sense, that we must understand the bold maxim of M. Royer Collard, — ‘we can assign no limits to skepticism; as soon as it enters the understanding, it takes entire possession of it.’”

“Accordingly, to sum up what I have said, I again present this challenge to my different adversaries, to those who dogmatize in metaphysics without having previously gone through psychology, to avoid hypothesis, even when they hit upon the truth; and to those who start from psychology and limit themselves to it, to avoid skepticism, and the most absolute skepticism. Hypothesis and skepticism, — here are the two consequences, which a rigid logic imposes in turn on my different adversaries. I leave them the choice. For myself, I accept neither the one, nor the other. I openly aspire to a philosophical dogmatism, equally extensive with the natural faith of the human race; and, in my opinion, we can arrive at this only by the same path, which the human race has followed, — the path of inward and outward experience, under the authority and the light of reason, as manifested in consciousness.”

It has been supposed by some individuals in our own country as well as in France, that Cousin maintains a Pantheistic system in his views of the Deity. Nothing could be more erroneous than this supposition. He has expressly disclaimed it, on more than one occasion; but he takes the trouble to repeat the

grounds, on which he differs from Pantheism ; and he does this with so much candor of spirit and clearness of expression, that we cannot refrain from presenting his vindication, as it may be called, entire.

“ I am unwilling to lay down my pen without once more briefly replying to certain attacks of quite a different nature, the repetition of which, in spite of all my explanations, shows me that some change may be made, at least in the expression of my views. I refer to the vague charge of Pantheism, which I have often set aside, and to which I wish to put a final stop.

“ This charge rests on the two following propositions, which are attributed to me.

“ 1. There is a single and only substance, of which the me and not me are merely modifications.

“ 2. The creation of the world is necessary.

“ Now, I aver that I absolutely and without reserve, reject both of these propositions, in the false and dangerous sense which it has pleased some persons to attach to them.

“ 1. In the few passages, in which I have spoken of a single substance, the word substance must be understood, not in its ordinary acceptation, but as it was understood by Plato, by the most eminent fathers of the Church, and by the Scriptures, in the sublime expression, ‘ I am that I am.’ The question here is evidently concerning the substance which exists with an absolute and eternal existence, and it is certain, that there is not, and there cannot be, more than one substance of this nature.

“ 2. I have never said, I never could say, that the me and the not me are merely modifications of a single substance ; but I have a hundred times said the contrary. If I have often designated the me and the not me by the name of phenomena, it is in opposition to that of substance, understood in the Platonic sense, and restricted to the Deity ; and I cannot conceive why it has been inferred from this incontestable opposition, that, in my view, these phenomena do not exist, in their own manner, and with the limited independence which belongs to them. How could I make of the me and the not me merely simple modifications of another being, when I everywhere undertake to establish, that they are causes, forces, in the sense of Leibnitz, and when all my moral and political philosophy is founded on the idea of the me, considered as a force, whose essential attribute is liberty ? In fine, after having so often demonstrated, with Leibnitz and M. de Biran, that the notion of cause is the foundation of that of substance, how

could I suppose it necessary to declare, that the me and the not me, being causes, and forces, and substances, and, if you please, finite substances, as soon as we learn to take the word being and substance in the high acception, to which I have just referred? To say no more, if the expression, finite substances, can obviate any honest scruples, I will cheerfully add it to that of phenomena and forces, applied to nature and to man. It is immeasurably better to clear up or to reform a word, even without necessity, than to run the risk of scandalizing a single individual among our fellow men.

"3. It remains to speak of the necessity of creation. On reflection, I find myself that this expression is deficient in reverence towards the Deity; it has the appearance of destroying his liberty, and I do not hesitate to retract it; but in so doing, I must offer an explanation. It conceals no mystery of fatalism; it expresses an idea which is found everywhere, among the most learned divines, as well as the most eminent philosophers. God, like man, acts and can act only in conformity with his nature; and even his liberty is relative to his essence. Now, in God especially, force is adequate to substance, and the divine force is always in action; God, therefore, is essentially active, essentially a creator. Hence it follows, that unless we deprive God of his nature and his essential perfections, we must admit, that a power essentially creative cannot but create, as a power essentially intelligent cannot but create with intelligence, as a power essentially wise and good cannot but create with wisdom and goodness. The word necessity expresses nothing else. It is utterly inconceivable how I should be charged with universal fatalism, on account of the use of this word. What! because I refer the action of God to nothing but his substance, do I consider this action as blind and fatal? Is it impiety to place one attribute of God, liberty, in harmony with all his other attributes, and with the divine nature itself? Do piety and orthodoxy consist in submitting all the attributes of God to a single attribute, so that wherever great teachers have written, 'the eternal laws of divine justice,' we must substitute 'the arbitrary decrees of God;' wherever they have written 'it is conformable to the nature of God, to his wisdom, to his goodness, and the like, to act in such or such a manner,' we must substitute, 'that this is neither conformable nor repugnant to his nature, but that it has pleased him arbitrarily to do so?' This is the doctrine of Hobbes on human legislation applied to the government of God. It is more than two thousand years since Plato prostrated this doctrine, and reduced it, in the 'Euthyphron,' to the most impious absurdities. Thomas

Aquinas combated it, as soon as it reappeared in Christian Europe, and it might be supposed that it could not survive the consequences which were drawn from it by the intrepid logic of Occam. But let us go to the root of the evil, namely, an incomplete and vicious theory of liberty. Here is displayed the power of psychology. Every psychological error brings with it other errors of the gravest character; a mistake in regard to the liberty of man almost necessarily involves a mistake in regard to the liberty of God. I trust that I have elsewhere proved, without vain subtlety, that there is a real distinction between free-will and liberty. Free-will is the power of volition, accompanied with deliberation between different objects, and under the paramount condition, that whenever, in consequence of deliberation, we resolve on such or such a volition, we are at the same time conscious that we might have formed and can still form a contrary volition. It is in the will, and in the array of phenomena which surround it, that we perceive the most decided expression of liberty; but it is not exhausted in those phenomena. There are certain rare and sublime moments, in which liberty is great, in proportion as it is less apparent to a superficial observation. I have often referred to the example of d'Assas. D'Assas did not deliberate; but was he the less free on that account? Did he not act with perfect liberty? The saint, who, after the long and painful exercise of virtue, is enabled to practise, as it were, naturally, those acts of self-renunciation, which are the most difficult to human infirmity; the saint, who has escaped from the struggles and contradictions of the form of liberty which is called will; has he, therefore, gone back, instead of having advanced? Is he no longer anything but a blind and passive instrument of grace, as Luther and Calvin erroneously supposed, by reason of an extravagant interpretation of the doctrine of Augustine? By no means. He still remains free; far from being exhausted, his liberty is elevated and enlarged, as it becomes more pure; from the human form of will, it has passed to the form almost divine of spontaneity. Spontaneity is essentially free, although it is accompanied by no deliberation, and although, in the rapid burst of its inspired action, it escapes from itself, and scarcely leaves a trace in the depths of the consciousness. Let us transfer this exact psychology to the sphere of theology, and we shall perceive, without the aid of hypothesis, that spontaneity is also the eminent form of the divine liberty. Without doubt, the Deity is free; for, among other proofs, it would be absurd to suppose that there was less in the first cause, than in one of its effects, humanity; the Deity is free, but not with

that liberty which is relative to our two-fold nature, and made to struggle against passion and error, and thus to produce virtue and our imperfect science by painful efforts; he is free with a liberty relative to his divine nature, that is to say, unlimited, infinite, acknowledging no obstacle. The purest spontaneity in man, — that which Christianity calls the liberty of the sons of God, — is merely a shadow of the liberty of their Father. Between the just and the unjust, between good and evil, between reason and its opposite, God cannot deliberate, and consequently does not exercise volition, according to the manner of men. Is it possible even to conceive that God should not always act for the best? The very supposition is impious. We must, therefore, admit, that when he takes the contrary course, he acts freely, no doubt, but not arbitrarily, or with the consciousness that he might have done otherwise. His nature, all powerful, all just, all wise, is acted out with the spontaneity which comprehends the whole of liberty, and excludes at once the efforts and the sufferings of volition, and the mechanical operation of necessity. Such is the principle, and the true character of the divine action. Destroy the principle, take the action in itself, in its external form, if I may so call it; you have the action of nature in its systematic power, that is to say, fatality. Nature is the image of God; Fate is Providence itself made visible, before which we ought, indeed, to bow, but, at the same time, to refer it in spirit and truth to its principle, to the ineffable source in which the divine perfections are combined in that marvellous unity, which human science scarcely touches, except to decompose it for its own purposes, and thus to submit to diversity of views, and the contradictions of theologians and philosophers.”

Our extracts from the Preface have run out to such an unexpected length, that we have room for no others; and we will therefore close with his brief answer to the opponents of Eclecticism, as such.

“Let us proceed at once to the argument concealed under the declamations of every kind, which have been directed against Eclecticism. The principles of different systems are often contradictory; now contradictions destroy each other; they cannot, therefore, be combined in one and the same system. Here is my answer. This argument rests on the confounding of two things, essentially distinct; namely, the state in which Eclecticism finds the principles of different systems, and that to which it reduces them before it employs them. It finds

them often in such hostility and contradiction, that it can make no use of them while in that state. Let us suppose, for instance, that a system proposes this principle ; 'all ideas come from the senses ;' and another system the contrary principle ; 'no idea comes from the senses.' There is certainly no way of combining these two principles. What, then, is the process of Eclecticism ? It begins with destroying them both ; it first proves that they are both false in their exclusive pretensions ; then seeking what truth they contain, it derives from them the two following principles ; 'many ideas come from the senses ; many ideas do not come from the senses.' Now, these two new principles are no longer contradictory ; they are only different ; they can, therefore, be reconciled. It is then, and only then, that the last labor of Eclecticism takes place.

"I have already said, and I repeat the remark, in politics, where after long revolutions the parties appear before the legislative power, each of them presents itself with exclusive and contradictory pretensions, which cannot found a system of laws applicable to all. The legislator suppresses everything exclusive and unjust in these pretensions ; he reduces them to their legitimate claims ; and, by this salutary transformation, the elements of discord and war become the different principles, active and vigorous, of a great and powerful constitution.

"The legislator of philosophy, also, can and should pursue this course, in spite of the clamors of opposite systems ; for these clamors are inevitable ; they are the cries extorted from them by the operation to which they are submitted by Eclecticism, in order to place them in a condition in which it can employ them, and make them coöperate, in a just proportion, for the beautiful and learned harmony of contraries, which is the essence of genuine unity."

The reader will find in this enlarged edition of the "Fragments," a valuable article on the state of philosophy in Belgium ; some interesting notices on Abelard and Spinoza ; extracts from the correspondence of Descartes, and of Leibnitz, and of Malebranche ; and M. Cousin's Discourse on his reception to the French Academy. The latter piece being a Eulogy on his predecessor in the Academy, M. Fourier, is one of the most beautiful specimens of rhetorical composition, in a department of eloquence, for which the French are celebrated, that we have met with for a long time.

ART. III. — *The Development of Humanity, or, Reflections on Moral Obligation, the Philosophy of History, Philosophy, and Politics.*

My life has not been checkered by any startling incidents, and yet it has been one in some respects peculiar. Under my instructors, I learned, and I have always *felt*, that I have, at least, a conscience; and a strong sense of moral accountability, in all my wanderings from the path of truth, has ever been present with me, and in the clearness of its dictates never permitted me to pause to inquire whether it be an original, or secondary power of the mind. No one could, I believe, have listened to the instructions with which I was favored, without having his mind agitated by those reflections, which reach the deep foundations of the mind, and embrace those many and important questions of morals, which are now becoming so momentous in theology, in individual practice, and national ethics. Strange as it may seem, the strong sense of moral accountability, quickened by my early tuition, led me to question, to doubt, and measurably to reject, our divine Religion; its mysteries, which no man seemed able to clear up; its ultimate truths, which it requires a knowledge of all history, of the present condition and future prospects of our race, to understand. Wanting correct metaphysical knowledge, these, with other objections, presented themselves like impassable mountains to my view. Many reflections of my own, many suggestions, from various sources, distracted and disheartened me. I could not comprehend God's economy, and I desponded. But, I always felt constrained, if not by the constitution of my own nature, yet by some inexplicable and pervading influence, to go out amongst men, a pioneer into the outskirts of the moral wilderness, where the human intellect and affections lay waste and uncultivated. I had strong confidence in man's moral sentiments, or rather in that feeling, which embraces

the whole family of man as proceeding from the same source, intended for the same sphere of action, and entitled to the same equality ; and I felt, and still feel it my duty, under other, perhaps firmer, impulses, to aid in developing all that relates to man's welfare, and to war against every principle and passion which tends to retard his progress towards a better state of things. I felt certain, that, whether the religion of Christ was true or false, in this sentiment there could be no error. So long as man had happiness to attain, (even in this world,) and as this could be attained only by moral influences, it was obviously my duty to gain some eminence, by industry and purity of life, and from my own centre diffuse the light and warmth of intellect and sentiment. What were the means to be used for this purpose ? what was the system to be adopted ? These questions perplexed and distracted me. The old forms of government had proved inadequate, and our own was confessedly an experiment. The systems of individual morality had failed ; religion had not produced its promised fruits among its followers : and its discordant principles, as manifested in its thousand churches ; the moral condition of the world, when viewed without reference to Christianity, inconsistent with a divine perfection ; the intrinsic difficulties of religion itself, — these hung over me like clouds of evil portent, and darkened the prospect all around. But I had a strange confidence in man, which produced a controlling belief, that the perfection of his moral character was the ultimate aim of the great system of the world ; and this idea has been the thread, which has guided from the labyrinth to light, from error to truth, from doubt and despondency to confidence and action. The way was wearisome, dark, and intricate, but it has led to that elevated point, whence I can see the sun in the sky, — the God in Heaven.

I read much, but reflected more. The unity of the great system of Christianity, its adaptation to the condition and improvement of man ; its past history, present progress, and future prospects, as compared

with other forms of religion, and its divine morality, *the cause and end of all these*, when presented to the mind with all their connexions, produced the unwavering conviction that

“The universal Cause
Acts to one end, but acts by various laws.”

I perceived that man was created with design, and that the ultimate end of his creation could only be attained through the influence of moral obligations;—but what were these moral obligations? The obscure deductions of natural reason? Whose, and what system shall we adopt? Now in the *glorious* light of the nineteenth century, what school of morals will give laws to human society? The religion of Christ has expanded its wisdom, and unfolded its resources as society has advanced, and its dictates are daily becoming established, as founded on the ultimate truths of Human Philosophy, while the great systems of natural ethics, built with much thought, and finished with exquisite care, like the frost-work palace of the northern Sybarite, are melting in the balmy breath of that spring, which will bring its summer of flowers and of fruits to the family of man. To ascertain the ground of moral obligation has been the object of ethical writers, ever since man began to reflect and reason, and still continues to be; but men, not content with inquiring into their own direct moral obligation, have proceeded to build up a system, which shall reach the purposes of the Divine Intellect in the creation and economy of Humanity. But it will readily be perceived, that the foundation of moral obligation must be established as a precedent condition of such system, or must intimately flow, as a general conclusion, from the system itself. Consequently, in the present state of moral science, any theory, which aims at this sublime height, must begin by categorically affirming or denying the fact of such moral obligation.

And this has been the case with the theory of M. Cousin. Though I look upon M. Cousin's theory as the best argument for, and clearest elucidation of,

moral obligation, I yet think his scheme, as advanced in his Introduction to the History of Philosophy, radically defective. Much is unquestionably due him, for having reduced reason to its simplest elements, and for having by these elements approached the system instituted for the government of the universe, in its mental and moral operations. His system may be reduced to three propositions. The race of man has been employed, 1st. In its infancy, in developing the idea of the Infinite; 2dly. In its greater maturity, in evolving the Finite; 3dly. And is now determining the relations of the Finite to the Infinite. This theory is more than splendid; it has its foundations deep laid in eternal truth; it reaches back beyond the time when the spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters, and in the translucence of pure and absolute reason, presents the forms and relations of finite and infinite laws. It is a clear apperception of Divinity. I find no objection to the spirit and principles of this theory, but I object to the form which it assumes, when it comes in the mind of its master, to be applied to the history of Humanity. Man is a *finite* being, only capable of developing that which is *finite*. The category of the Infinite, as an idea of development must be rejected,* except

* If I understand what is probably meant here, and in much which follows, I must add, that I think the writer misconceives the doctrine of M. Cousin. I am the more willing to adopt this conclusion, because he does not appear to have read but a single one of M. Cousin's numerous productions. And that, too, the most difficult of all his productions to be understood by one, who has no previous acquaintance with his general system of philosophy. The Introduction to the History of Philosophy is a great work, but it is adapted to those who have made metaphysics a profound study, and who also have some general knowledge of the metaphysical speculations, which have obtained in Continental Europe, since the time of Kant. English philosophy and the Scottish furnish no key to its meaning. It is also, to a great extent, dogmatic, and deals in results more than in processes. I would advise a man, therefore, to think twice, before he undertakes to publish a refutation of its doctrines. I see nothing in the point the writer of the present paper wishes to make out, at all at war with the doctrines of M. Cousin. The difference is apparent, not real, and results from the different points of view, in which the two writers contemplate a somewhat analogous subject.

so far as Revelation or Tradition, which implies a Revelation, has rolled back the clouds, and presented to our view the golden chain, which depends from Heaven, and connects earth with the throne of God. We feel

The object of the volume in question, is to establish the method, according to which the history of philosophy should be studied and written. But what is philosophy? It is the summary, the *résumé* of the development of Humanity; it follows, sums up, and completes the particular developments which the human race effects in industry, politics, art, and religion. It obeys the laws of human development, and contains all that is contained in the history of Humanity. The history of philosophy, is, then, par excellence, the history of Humanity. To ascertain the method, according to which it should be written, it is necessary to ascertain the various elements of Humanity, and the order in which they are developed. There can be nothing in philosophy that is not in Humanity. Consequently, when we know what is in Humanity, we must know what to look for in philosophy.

Now, Humanity in all its integrity, is in each individual of the race. To ascertain, then, what is in Humanity, we have only to ascertain what is in the individual. As philosophy, again, is the creation of the human intelligence, in order to know all the elements it can contain, we have only to ascertain the elements of the individual intelligence. Inasmuch as philosophy in fact contains all that is in the history of Humanity, it follows, that when we have ascertained the elements of the intelligence, as manifested in the individual, we have obtained the elements, to which may be reduced all the phenomena presented us by the individual consciousness, and by the history of the race.

Our first step is, then, to form our psychology; that is, by the analysis of the reason, as manifested in the consciousness of the individual, ascertain its fundamental and invariable elements. Our second step is, to look over the history of the race, especially its systems of philosophy, and find there again these same elements, and by finding them there verify our psychology. If we find the elements in history, which we had found in the individual, we may be assured that they are elements of Humanity, not merely idiosyncrasies of individual consciousness. If we find in the history of systems more elements than we have in our psychology, we may know that our psychology is incomplete; if fewer, then that something is to be retrenched from our psychology. This is the method we must adopt, in order to ascertain what is in Humanity, and, therefore, what we are to look for in its history. Having found these elements, then, it is necessary to ascertain, for the purpose of clearly comprehending the history of the race, what is the order of their development. In order to ascertain this for the race, we must ascertain what is their order of development in the individual; for as the race is in all its integrity in the individual, what is in the individual must be found again in the race, or at least the order of development, which actually occurs in the individual, must be that which occurs in the race.

ourselves finite ; " the flaming bounds of time and space " surround us, and we cannot overleap, or penetrate beyond them ; in mental, as well as in physical philosophy, we on all sides reach simple facts or ulti-

The analysis of the intelligence, as manifested in the consciousness of the individual, reduces all its phenomena to three ideas ; the idea of the infinite, the idea of the finite, and that of the relation of the two. Admitting this reduction, then, it follows, that to these three ideas, in their several proportions, are to be reduced all the phenomena observed in the history of mankind. Now, if we ascertain, by the study of the individual, what belongs to each of these elements respectively, and what results from the predominance of one or another, we shall know when we transport ourselves into history, whether of deeds or of opinions, which idea is predominant, and how to explain the occurrence of any particular phenomenon, at a particular time and place.

The reduction of the reason to three elements, the idea of the infinite, the idea of the finite, and that of their relation, is accepted by the author of the paper in question, and I need not, therefore, undertake to establish its justness. He does not object to the reduction, but to the account he supposes M. Cousin gives of the introduction of the first named idea, into the human intelligence, and to the order in which these ideas are developed in the history of Humanity. He asserts, that we do not attain to the idea of the infinite, by the development of an intelligence, and never attain to it, but as it is communicated to us by a supernatural revelation ; and in this he supposes he is at war with M. Cousin.

Now, M. Cousin does by no means assert that we arrive at this idea by our own intellectual development. This idea, the idea of the finite, and that of the relation of the two, are the constituent elements of the reason, viewed either as the principle of human intelligence, or of the Divine Intelligence itself. We are born with the reason, although with the reason undeveloped, consequently with the three ideas in question. They are, then, connate, inherent, underived. If the question concern the manner in which the idea of the infinite becomes a clear and intelligible idea of the understanding, and if it be contended that it becomes thus clear and intelligible only by means of a supernatural revelation, M. Cousin will not object. The development of the idea of the infinite in the understanding, is not attained by human agency. It is effected by the spontaneous working of the reason. The spontaneous development of the idea of the infinite, in the human intelligence, is precisely what the human race means, and always has meant, by the revelation of God. That this also took place more especially in the epoch of the world, when the idea of the infinite was the dominant idea, is what we should naturally infer, and what all tradition asserts. I am anxious to have this borne in mind, because some are so ignorant of M. Cousin's system of philosophy, as to fancy that it proceeds on the denial of revelation. But M. Cousin is a believer in revelation ; in Christianity, if we may believe his own assertion ; and his system is the only one, that has

mate truths, which we apprehend, but cannot explain, while we feel a consciousness that we could perceive the universal reason and relation of such fundamental truths, were they but once explained. God is omni-

come to my knowledge, which enables me to explain, on rational principles, the phenomenon of revelation, and to find firm ground for my faith as a Christian.

As it regards the order in which these ideas are developed in the history of Humanity, it should be remarked, that M. Cousin means by the development of these ideas in history, *their predominance*. The epoch of the infinite, is not necessarily that in which men have clear and precise notions of the infinite, but that in which the idea of the infinite predominates. The writer in question, appears to imagine that M. Cousin would have us believe, that we at first voluntarily, and consciously, seek to comprehend the idea of the infinite; and, that when we have comprehended that idea, we proceed to comprehend the idea of the finite, and then, in the last place, we proceed to tie the two ideas together. But I do not so understand him. The three ideas enumerated are constituent elements of the reason. The growth of Humanity consists in their development. But in this development they do not proceed *pari passu*. In other words, in the development of human intelligence, we come successively under the domination of each one of these ideas respectively. M. Cousin teaches, that, in the first epoch of our race, the idea of the infinite is the dominant element; it presides over the development of Humanity in that epoch, and gives the tone and character which that epoch bears in history. In other words, that the phenomena which appear in that epoch, appear then, and are what they are, not because men then have clear and precise notions of the infinite, but because that element of the intelligence which he names the idea of the infinite is then the most active, the ruling element. The element works spontaneously in the human race at that epoch; they obey it, are subjugated by it. It is their master, and compels them to establish that order of things, which comports with its exclusive dominion.

Now, is M. Cousin wrong in assigning this epoch to the infancy of our race? What should we look for when this element is the ruling one? When the individual is subjected by this idea, he does not reason, reflect; he affirms, trusts, believes, reverences, adores. He himself counts for nothing; he stands in awe of a power or powers above him. He contemplates things in their unity, their likeness, their identity. When the idea of the finite rules him, he doubts, denies, investigates, reasons, sees things in their multiplicity and diversity. When the idea of relation, of synthesis, predominates, he regards things in both their unity and multiplicity, in both their identity and diversity. These same characteristics we must find again, when we transport ourselves into history. The age of assertion, of trust, of faith in the individual, we all know, precedes that of doubt, denial, of analysis, reflection, and this last must precede that of synthesis; for we cannot proceed to consider relations, when we

cient, man is a free agent, but who will reveal the reason and relation of their inscrutable essences? In the investigation of man's philosophy, each is thrown back upon his own individuality, and he must enquire,

have but one term. We ought to find the same order in history. Do we find it? What is the epoch of spontaneous affirmation, of assertion, trust, faith, religion, if you please? Is it not the infancy of the race? Is it not that the epoch to which all traditions carry you back? and do not all traditions tell you, that, in the infancy of the race, God walked and talked with men? The period of doubt, of denial, of philosophy, is it not comparatively recent?

In religion, the exclusive domination of the idea of the Infinite sinks man and nature in God, and, therefore, terminates in Pantheism, and in Pantheism terminate all the religions of the Oriental world, except the Jewish. Spinoza is a really Oriental genius, and in him we see, as we ought to expect, religion ending in Pantheism. He is subjugated by the one idea of the Infinite, and merely reproduces what history assures us was the termination of all the old Oriental systems of faith. When the idea of the Finite predominates, the idea of infinity, of unity, can find no place. Consequently God, if he be admitted at all, must be the Totality, the Aggregate of particulars. And is not this idea represented in the Polytheism of Greece and Rome, subsequent, as everybody knows, to the Pantheistic systems of Asia and Egypt? When the last idea, that of Relation, predominates, religion rises to Theism, to one God, existing in tri-unity, as we see foreshadowed in Plato, and clearly taught in the Christian Fathers. This idea necessarily embraces both the others. The God in whom they who are ruled by this idea, believe, will not be a pure unity, nor a mere totality, but he will be, at once, infinite and finite, one and many, identity and diversity. This is the sublime God of the Christian, of the true philosopher also, the God of whom Plato had some clear intimations, and in whom the whole Orthodox Church has believed, and still believes. Now, is this sublime faith, as a ruling faith of Humanity, prior to the other two, or subsequent to them?

More, I should be glad to add, but I have already transgressed the ordinary bounds of a note. In adding this note, I have had no thought of detracting from the merits of the paper which it concerns. The writer of that paper is almost wholly unacquainted with the literature of Continental Europe, and has had little or no personal intercourse with those of our scholars who are somewhat familiar with it. The conclusions which he presents are those at which he has arrived, almost wholly, by his own unassisted reflections. The paper, considered as proceeding from a man in the interior of our country, away from what we regard as the principal centres of ideas, beginning in doubt and despondency, and laboring alone, in the solitude of his own being, is, I must needs think, remarkable and cheering. It is honorable to the writer, as an individual, for it holds out the promise, that the public may one day be under obligations to him

whence came I? what is the immediate object of my existence? and what are the future prospects of my race? Has Philosophy answered any one of these questions? Strike Bible-truths * from the record, and then question the fifty centuries of man's generations, and what will be the answer to the interrogatory? Ignorance, crime, and misery; movement in a contracted circle, returning at short and rapid intervals to the point of departure. This would be the law of finity; finite in itself, its circle must be finite; but when Infinitude prescribes the line of existence and duty, eternity may become the orbit of its action.

In recurring to the history of man, the two controlling principles are discovered, of Revelation and Development. Without demanding, as a postulate, what the system I put forth, properly expanded and elucidated, would prove, namely, that there has been a Revelation, I take the history of the race as it is presented in its arts, sciences, and literature. Literally,

for greater favors. It also affords a cheering proof, that, however the mind may be at times overcast, and perplexed with doubts and difficulties, if left to itself, to its own free action, it will work itself into light, into a clear and sunny day, and be able to repose with serene faith on the bosom of God. One thing I will merely add; as the writer complains, that we have no satisfactory work on Moral Obligation, I would say that Jouffroy's "*Cours du Droit Naturel*," leaves little to be desired on that head; and I am happy to announce the fact, that an English translation of it, by a highly esteemed friend, is now passing through the press of this city, and will probably be soon before the public. — EDITOR.

* I am unwilling to let this sentence pass without a remark, because it seems to imply a charge against philosophy, which is altogether unfounded. In the first place, philosophy does not deny Bible-truths; it merely seeks to explain and comprehend them. In the second place, it does not pretend to be able of itself to discover what are termed Bible-truths. *Philosophy does not pretend to be a discoverer of truth, nor an originator of ideas.* All it lays claim to is the ability to comprehend the truths in the possession of the human intelligence, and to point out the ground of their certainty. Its sole business is to clear up and verify. I hope this will be borne in mind. There is no occasion for war between the partizans of Revelation and the friends of Philosophy. For my own part, I believe in revelation as firmly as any of my Christian brethren; and I also value philosophy. The time is gone by, when the Christian and the philosopher must be regarded as enemies. — EDITOR.

or metaphorically, "eastward out of Eden," the fountain of human existence was parted into two heads, and according to indubitable history one rapidly advanced to a point of comparative perfection, at which it remained stationary; the other was driven out from the face of the earth, a fugitive and a vagabond; and if this portion of the human family was not originally corrupt and degraded, it lost, as it departed from its original source, the presence of the truth which lingered in the earlier monuments. In the history of man the category of the Infinite does not appear as an idea of development, nor can the finite grasp the Infinite;* the less cannot comprehend the greater intelligence by its own act, or volition. The Infinite must be an idea of Revelation, and we must depend upon this source for our perception of it, and upon a peculiar people and a particular chain of connected circumstances for its preservation. From Revelation we originally received it, and it required a *second* Revelation, for a full disclosure of its attributes, and of the influences which it was, and is to exert over the welfare of Humanity. Beyond this Revelation, the mind cannot take a single step towards a comprehension of the Infinite, nor was there ever a period in the history of the human intellect, when its boldest speculations brought home its simplest truths. The convictions of Socrates, and the philosophizing of Cicero, did not profess to be the discovery of a new truth, but the mere argument of a preëxisting, doubtful question. The idea of the Infinite, rude and imperfect as it was, possessed a breadth, depth, and transparency among the Hebrews, which it could not pretend to among any other people. It was not a secondary element in the organization of the Jews, but it was the breath of life to their religion, morals, and polity. Here it was

* This is true. But man does grasp the Infinite. He does not, indeed, *comprehend* it, but he *apprehends* it, has a real conception of it. How account for this fact, if the idea of the Infinite be not, as M. Cousin contends, an element of the Reason, which is the principle of human intelligence? — EDITOR.

the soul, the animating principle, but with other nations, where it had degenerated to a mere tradition, it became a secondary and subservient principle, and, perhaps, by its very vagueness, leading to the development of the finite. The dim remembrance of Jehovah and his power would lay the rude foundation for a morality, and a worship, which, in its excesses and material manifestations, would educe statuary, architecture, and painting; whereas had this idea been less distinct, sufficient impetus and direction would not have been given to the human mind for this purpose, as is seen in our North American Indians, who, for the want of this impulsive force, have remained for unnumbered ages, without commencing the line of progression. The revealed idea of the Infinite was retained by the Hebrew race, without any additional development of the idea itself, or of the elements of Humanity, for progress could be attained only by change, and to change the character of a people is to unsettle it from all its foundations; and, in the synchronic relations of the kingdoms of the earth, to have changed the character of the Hebrews, would have been to mix them up with that mass of nations, whose empires were shattered as the broken wine-cups of their revel. Through all changes, the Hebrew was a Jew; no other men possessed the same permanence of character, which kept the Hebrews distinct, when all the nations of the earth were tossing on a sea of change, or sinking down, like its subsiding waves, into an undistinguishable mass. None other possessed that individuality, which separated, and continues to separate them, from the children of men. They were the proper depository of the solemn and only half-revealed secret, on which the welfare of Humanity depended.

The idea of the Infinite was preserved amongst the Hebrews by their being cut off in their character and institutions from the changes common to the rest of mankind, whilst the *profane* nations were rapidly developing the elements of the finite, or unfolding the principles of our moral nature, in educating arts, scien-

ces, politics, and all that was essential to elevate and improve the condition and character of man, so far as could be done without any, or but slight connexion, with the idea of the Infinite. In the retrospect, we are presented with a nation evolving some principle, which constituted the basis, or *point d'appui*, on which a future development took place, and so on successively, the achievement of the former era becoming the substratum, on which the subsequent age built its portion of the great system, which is regulating the affairs of the world. In the whole, we see an adaptation of means to ends, evidently proposed to be accomplished; as nation succeeded nation, the energies of each converged to the elucidation of some principle, which required that peculiar combination of circumstances for its evolution. Each having produced its effect, having passed through its cycle, a slow and creeping decay came on, and with exhausted energies became an easy prey to a new and vigorous race of men, who arose at the proper time to take possession of the empire, and transfer to itself the full benefit of the principle elicited by its predecessor, and start in the full career of its own additional development,—from the central plateaus of Asia to Egypt, thence to Greece, to Rome, to Jerusalem, and there, uniting with the revealed idea of the Infinite, burst from a cloud of night to radiate over a world.

Christ in Jerusalem; was he, like myself, mere Humanity, or the direct representative of the Infinite? Although the *mere* performance of a miracle may be no evidence, whether the agent is from “heaven above, or hell beneath,” yet, when miracles, in their very performance, constitute a virtue, and when they contain a seminal principle, which produces its fruit for the well-being of man through all after-time, in the moral duties, which they explain and inculcate, they form a criterion to guide us, and to me they seem a pencil of light, radiated from the throne of Beneficence. Were these miracles performed? The miracles of Christ were of two characters, which may be denomi-

nated special and general; the special were those performed as a mere proof of his power; the general, which comprehended the object of the special, contained lessons of morality. The age of their performance was rude and uncultivated; miracles and parables were the only mediums for the communication of moral truths to men, who required something palpable to command their belief, and to fix their morality. And this testimony was sufficient for those men in that age, who could not fully appreciate the necessity of moral truths and obligations, to compel them to become the disciples of a faith, which was sown in penury, and matured in blood. The temple of the human character had been broken down; arch, dome, fane, and altar, thrown in one promiscuous ruin, and beneath all was hidden the *memorial tablet*, on which the law of man's better destiny was written; but, if the world had been created fair and wide, and man made happy without any exertion of his own, what would have been man's virtue, and where would have been his merits? where would have been the beautiful evolution of truth from error? where, the evidences of this truth, in the consummation of promises, after the performance was beyond human probability? where, the nicely adjusted system, which, in the complexure of all its parts, brought Christ at the only period, at which the revelation of the Infinite could have been combined with the development of the finite, and their united energies transmitted to the future by the moral influences and material manifestations of the Infinite, by miracles, to the obscure and uneducated disciples, giving them that hope which sustained, that love which cheered and united, and that truth, which pointed them to the skies? The evidence was sufficient for this purpose, but in process of time it lost its effect, by the corruptions, fooleries, and impositions of the dark ages, when miracles were ascribed even to inanimate objects, so as to contradict the senses, and expose the whole frame-work of religion to suspicion, and with many, to ridicule. But miracles are

not to be rejected, beaming with living light in the darkness of the early dawn of our Faith, now, when an unclouded noon, succeeding such a morn, is going upward to its apex. Now, when religion is philosophy, and philosophy perceives the reason of moral existences, and explains their condition and development upon principles, and a spirit borrowed from religion, I regard as conclusive the testimony of developed science, sustaining Revelation, and the revelation of the Infinite operating upon man's progression, and extending his hopes and duties, in teaching him his relation to the finite and the Infinite, — to man, to God, and the eternities of the past and future. The testimony is daily accumulating; we are solving the great mysteries of life, and if we cannot explain the secret problem of the creation, we are beginning to reach the catenation and wisdom which combines and directs the system of the universe to the accomplishment of its purpose. We commence with man's original condition, and trace his development through each successive age. We are extracting the principles which have been called into action in his past and present history, and, from the indications of his moral and physical constitution, we are reaching forward to the final object of creation. We have read the history of the past, and we have seen kings, tyrants, nobles, and priests, of all religions, swell the gorgeous train, and in their rear we have beheld oppression, penury, crime, and misery, following up the steep ascent in paths made slippery with blood, yet each bearing a necessary relation to the great system of Development. Kings and nobles established grades in society, and taught man the necessity of exertion to rise to their level; kings and nobles degenerated into tyrants, and oppression taught man the necessity of ascertaining and defending his rights. The priesthood, in all ages of the world, has been the antagonistical power of the throne, giving and enjoying immunities, and in turns protecting and oppressing the masses, until licentiousness of caste and profligacy

of life impaired, and finally destroyed their influence. We have seen the experiment tried on man as a mere religious, sensual, legal, political, and ideal being, and ever failing, but unfolding the principles of each; and this age, in which we are individually retarding or accelerating the great economy, is the age of charity, (the development of the moral feelings,) founded on a love of Humanity, visiting the dungeon, the dens of drunkenness and vice, the forest, the isles of the sea, and the continents lying in moral darkness. Its active spirit is at work in the senate, the lecture-room, the pulpit, the review, the newspaper, and on the fervent tongues of men; it is spreading over the wide surface of human society, coalescing with all the other sentiments of our nature, and melting them down to the level of equality. And this will be the last development of Humanity, the fulfilment of the principle or idea of creation, which induced its existence, constituted its development, and justifies its eternal wisdom. "Truth is no longer a fountain bubbling in the wilderness, slaking the thirst of the weary and desponding traveller," who has reached its brink after long toil and danger; it is now the bright and beautiful valley of my own childhood, where hill and dale, woodland and wheatfield, rivulet and river, dispense the fulness of their blessings.

I have presented what I believe to be, a true theory of History, but what has been the law of its development? Revelation has borne its important part, not as a law, but as a means. But, in what principle of our nature has the development of the finite had its foundation? Locke, with his followers, reduces the entire sum of our knowledge to the single source of sensation. This is a truth, but only a partial truth; the blind man has the capacity to appreciate colors, but because the source,—the sense,—is obstructed, he cannot distinguish, nor have any adequate conception of colors; and in proportion as the sensations are obstructed, the sources of knowledge are circumscribed. The blind cannot appreciate colors, the deaf have

no idea of sound, and as the avenues of communication with the external world are closed up, the pictured imagery which adorns the mind is blotted out, as in a chamber of darkness. It is by the agency of the external world, that the manifestations of the internal or absolute world of reason is perceived ; but, it is only through the slow and painful processes of sensation, that we arrive at fundamental truth. We begin at unity, and ascend, through all the grades of multiplicity. We must first understand what is an *unit*, before we can reach the *dual*, and we must ascend through all the grades of numbers, by sensation, by sound, sight, or touch. When ten and ten are added together, and the product declared to be twenty, we only arrive at the conclusion by the perception of each grade in the series of numbers ; when we say, that in any right-angled triangle the square described upon the side subtending the right angle is equal to the squares described upon the sides, which contain the right angle, we affirm a proposition made up of unities, and it is only by descending to the definition of a *line*, and then advancing, step by step, in the perception of single propositions presented by the senses, that we arrive at the ultimate conclusion, and it is only by the thorough knowledge which reiterated sensations (*habit*) give us of the use of the simple numerals, that we feel any confidence in the higher arithmetical or geometrical combinations, and as these advance out of our ordinary associations, our confidence in their truth becomes more limited. From the relations of society, the laws which govern that society are manifested. We see violence and rapine, or we feel their effects, and perceive the necessity for a law of punishment, as in the natural world, the running brook points out a law of fluids. We are created with a reference to the material world, which surrounds us, nor can we reach a single thought, not connected with materiality. We can ascend to God, because he is the Creator of the material, and has vouchsafed it his presence ; we can descend to the depths of Hell,

for crime has taught the necessity of punishment ; but beyond the ideas which spring from the intimate and necessary relation of the material world to the Infinite, there is no progress, no hope, nor necessity of any progress. Thus far, I give in my adhesion to the school of sensation. But God is above, the material world is around, and our *personality* speaks audibly within us. If there are sensations, must there not be a perceptive faculty, which takes cognizance of such sensations, and reports the operations of the material world ? and must not the perceptive faculty be a *personality*, which is active, exercising volition, choosing between good and evil, selecting, arranging, and combining ideas, and which presents mental phenomena peculiar to itself, as when the perceptions are perfect but the *will* is deranged, and *e converso*, when the perceptions are disordered, the will acting supremely and controlling the chaos. But, is the analysis perfect so far as we have advanced, and are the ultimate facts established, that these are original powers of the mind ? Sensation is a generic term, embracing all the phenomena of touch. Sound, sight, taste, smell, are only modifications of touch, and the activity of touch is sensation ; light must fall upon the eye, and to produce vision must fall in a proper direction ; the undulations of air must strike the ear ; odors meet the olfactory nerves, and substances be applied to the tongue. These are mere phenomena of physical organization, belonging to the brute, the idiot, and equally to every order of intellect, and not unfrequently in the highest degree of perfection to the lowest. Sensations, therefore, are only modifications of the sense of touch, and as such only a medium of *perception*.

“Life makes the soul dependent on the dust ;
Death gives her wings to mount above the spheres ;
Through chinks, styl'd organs, *life peeps out at light* ;
Death bursts the involving cloud, and all is day ;
All eye, all ear, the disembodied power.”

I do not subscribe to the doctrine of sensation, as a
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mental faculty, any more than I consider light a part of the sense of seeing; light may be an element of vision, but it constitutes no part of the organ of vision; and sensation may be necessary to the perception of external existences and relations, but it is not the perception of those existences and relations. *Perception is personality*;* it is active; it has no passive mood; it is the faculty which takes cognizance of the sensations, examines their properties, determines their relations, and defines their essence. Sensation may or may not command its attention, for if the perceptive faculty (personality) be deeply engaged, sensation may pass unobserved. Perception is essentially active, and we can form no idea of it, except in its activity. Perception, again, is personality; it is that within us, which is active, which perceives, arranges, combines. It is active in all we know of it; it is

* This analysis, I think, might be carried further. Personality, and the faculty of perceiving, I think, may be distinguished, though not disjoined. Personality resides in the activity. It is possible, I believe, for us to conceive of an agent, that should not be percipient, as it is equally possible to conceive of a being that should be percipient, and yet have no volition, no proper personality. This last is what actually occurs in mental alienation, and to some extent in dreams, revery, somnambulism, and especially in what is termed magnetic somnambulism. In all these cases, intellectual functions are executed, often of the highest order, and the most brilliant character, without our will, our proper personal activity, having anything to do with them.

Then, again, if perception be personality, we ought to be able to perceive whatever we will, and precisely as we will, which everybody knows is not the fact. By perception, as a faculty of the mind, the writer must mean the faculty of knowing, the cognitive faculty. If he means anything else, he must mean by it the act of perceiving, and then he would fall into the mistake of confounding the act with the agent. I suppose he means by the perception, the faculty of cognition, simply the intelligence. If so, there must be an agent, which possesses this faculty. This agent must be the *ME*. To call this faculty personality, is to commit the mistake of confounding the accident with the substance, the quality with its subject. That personality intervenes in the act of perception, that it is necessary that we should attend in order to perceive, I readily admit, and this is the fact, which I suppose has misled the writer of the article. But, as I have discussed this subject at some length in my January and April numbers, I need add no more here. — EDITOR.

volition, will, or personality. Locke proceeded but little further than to define and establish the use of *brute* sensation; unconsciously, however, he had indicated an important element of mind, which Reid developed. When Locke said,* “that general and universal belong not to the real existence of things, but are the *inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use*,” he affirmed the personality, the distinct, and independent action of the mind; yet, starting from sensation, he could not extricate himself from his own labyrinth, for if sensation be the sole source of ideas, the mind, in its acquisition of knowledge, must be entirely passive; but I have shown, that sensation is not a *source*, but a *medium* of knowledge, of ideas. Reid seized this fact, and other phenomena, and affirmed the personality of mind in a broad and exclusive sense, destroying the material manifestations.† He says, “An object, in being perceived, does not act at all. I perceive the walls of the room where I sit; but they are perfectly inactive, and, therefore, act not upon the mind. To be perceived is what logicians call an external denomination, which implies neither action nor quality in the object perceived. Nor could men ever have gone into this notion, that perception is owing to some action of the object upon the mind, were it not, that we are so prone to form our notions of the mind from some similitude we conceive between it and body.” Here is a confusion of terms; because perception, or “to be perceived,” in the author’s language, “is what logicians call an external denomination, which implies neither action, nor quality in the object perceived;” therefore “men never could have gone into the notion, that perception is owing to some action of the object upon the mind;” but I would call up the spirit of the Philosopher of Glasgow College, were not his followers rife in the land as the bearded grain-stocks of harvest, to answer, that, if the rays of light had not been

* Book 3, § 11.

† Essay II. Chap. 14.

reflected from the wall, and fallen on the retina of the eye, would the wall have been perceived? The wall was certainly inactive, but reflected light was the medium of communication, that which produced an effect upon the nerves of the eye, and of which the mind took cognizance.

But Reid had performed for M. Cousin what Locke had done for Reid. The affirmation of "first principles," "necessary truths" was an approximation to the last analysis, which "unfolds objects of intellect of a superior order, and nature, which are permanent and immutable. These are ideas, or universal nature, of which the objects of sense are only the images, or shadows." This is part of Reid's description of *ideas* as taught by the Pythagorean school, but he did not perceive the identity of ideas, or, pure, absolute, universal, impersonal reason with his own *first principles*, or *necessary truths*. Why were these truths necessary? Because they must have had an existence, independent and prior to matter and finite relations; two and two would have been four had matter never been created to manifest the abstract truth by their embodiment, and two and two would have been four had there never been a human mind to perceive; and so with every truth, with every form and relation of existence, and thus have we arrived at the abstract, the absolute, the universal, the impersonal reason; and the material world, with all its relations, is a palpable reflex of this absolute and impalpable (the impersonal) reason. Man, then, is a being created with a direct reference to the material world, which surrounds him, and of the world of pure thought, (impersonal reason,) which is represented and manifested by such material world. This last analysis of mind, then, furnishes us with personality and impersonal reason, or those ideas which would be truths, had there never been matter to reflect their essence, nor human intellect to perceive their truth and beauty. In the unchronicled eternity of the past, the abstract and impalpable forms of things, of mental and moral laws, existed in the Di-

vine Mind, and the world is the reflection of their effulgence, carrying forward to the eternity of the future their development, their truth, their beauty, their majesty, and holiness, when one faith, one worship, shall unite all tongues, and kindreds, and one throb of rapture swell the mighty heart of Humanity.

Admit, now, that we have personality, which reflects, arranges, combines, wills, and that we have also impersonal reason. Where has this impersonal reason its locality? In the Eternal Mind alone? If so, then, how can the human mind, perceive, use, arrange, combine, and take cognizance of all its forms and essences? It cannot be by sensation, because *it* gives, and only can give, mere sensation; it cannot give an impalpable abstraction. Put four balls into the hands of an idiot, and the four balls will give him all the sensations it would a body encasing the intellect of an angel, and yet the idiot will not comprehend any of the truths enveloped in these material types. Were it otherwise, intellect would be in proportion to animal sensibility. Ideas, then, do not come from sensation; they must, therefore, exist in the mind, for they cannot be perceived where they do not exist. The world, then, is the reflex of the impersonal reason, and our personality is the connecting principle, which forms the *trinoda necessitas*, and in its unity represents a Trinity. We have now entered within the portal of eternity, and evoked the spirit of its wisdom, and a voice from all its mighty width and depth comes up, proclaiming us the sons of God, "made in his own image, after his own likeness," all free, and all essentially equal.

Here let me draw a few deductions bearing on my own peculiar modes of thought. We have traced one element of the mind to that absolute, and, therefore, impersonal reason, which is independent of the material world, and would still be reason, had there never been a world as its shadow and representative, nor Humanity to perceive it; and truth, justice, and mercy, as abstract truths, will exist when the earth shall have

passed away as the sound of an old and glorious song, and there shall be no human mind to remember its music, as much as they do now, when they thrill in the pulses of the human heart ; then, admit the deduction, that conscience is the personality, which perceives a want of harmony between the absolute or impersonal reason, and the actual conduct of life, or rather a discordance of the personality, the will with the impersonal reason, those

"solemn counsels, images of awe,
Truths, which eternity lets fall on man ;
Thoughts, such as shall revisit our last hour ;
Visit uncall'd, and *live when life expires.*"

Here is established the foundation of virtue ; and moral obligation is the necessity of conforming our conduct, our WILL to the impersonal reason. The impersonal reason, in our view of it, harmonizes all those phenomena of mind, which philosophers of all ages have observed, named, but not defined, such as, spontaneity, inner light, intuitive process, inductive reason ; it defines taste, and enforces the moral laws ; it is the Word, which was in the Beginning, which was with God, and *which was God*, and which *light* represented by the person of Christ, in the conformity of his life and manners to the Word, which was God, (to the pure, impersonal reason,) made him the witness of the light, "that all men through him might believe." I appeal to the consciousness of every good man to say, if it is not by the contemplation of what he calls *virtuous principles*, (abstract universal truths,) which are associated in his mind with the will and spiritual essence of God, that he attains simplicity of manners, and purity of purpose, and perceives his mind lighted up with "the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." The good man is the reflection, the impersonation of the Eternal Reason. But, in the analysis of mind, we have found another important element, personality ; that which perceives, arranges, combines, and *wills*. This principle is essentially free ; no prison can prevent, no chains can

bind its action. Ignorance and prejudice may misdirect it; the tyrant's axe and the hangman's cord may cut off this free, uprising spirit, but so long as it is connected with our material forms, it exists in vital freedom; in every wish, and in every resolve, it asserts this vitality; and let the heel of oppression knead it down in the dust, with the blood of human victims; let the institutions of society repress, and sophists in government or religion mislead, this upward and onward spirit is swelling with all the hopes, feelings, and strong resolves of Universal Man, and will conduct the world to true and sublime FREEDOM.

Having thus arrived at a strong conviction of the truths of religion, as founded in the eternal (impersonal) reason, other difficulties, which have not been solved, presented themselves to my mind. Religion cannot be special in its principles or purposes. If it is founded on the reason, which is universal, it can neither be limited nor special in its application. It must be founded in this reason, or not be a representative of the Universal Mind, which can be represented only by the harmony of all parts of the system, tending to unity. Religion was not revealed as a special creed; it was not the object of Revelation to divide the universal reason into the petty personalities of sectarianism; the ultimate end of religion was, not the dismemberment of that vast and harmonious system of morality, which exists in the Divine Mind, and of which the world is intended, at some day, to be a reflection. It cannot, therefore, have been the proposed *end* of Revelation to make Baptists, Methodists, Presbyterians, or Episcopalians, and in this variety of forms represent the totality and unity of God's wisdom, and thus complete the development. The *forms* of religion were not the object of the Divine Lawgiver; these, embracing human passions and energies, are only the scaffoldings used in erecting the temple, and will be thrown away and forgotten when the fabric itself, through coming years, shall reflect the glory and the sunshine of peace. The breaking up of the Chris-

tian Church into sects and creeds, has, and will continue to call forth, all human energies to the promotion of their individual faiths and enterprizes, but who cannot see, beneath all these, the deeper and broader current of one faith, one hope, one morality, "proceeding out of the throne of God," (the fountain head of the pure reason,) and embracing the whole family of man, and bearing them onward to the consummation of, "Peace on earth, and good will" to one another.

In religion, as in science, those truths which clearly exist, and are admitted by all, which are not purely speculative, but which can be brought to the test of practical application, must be adopted as the rule of conduct, and as the qualification of membership. Religion is an application of the Divine Reason to the practical duties of life, and these may be brought, and are daily brought, as scientific truths are, to the test of experience, and to attain an unity of faith, men must unite on the practical philosophy of the Bible; on its reason, universally applicable to conduct; on its *common sense*, and leave its purely speculative visions to future hours, beyond the grave, when we shall be altogether spiritual, and when a proper coincidence between *soul* and *external relations* will not be the test of truth. Without being avowed, this principle is daily growing into practice; the party-walls of division are breaking down, and churches coming into closer alliance, until at last, there is prepared one broad area, on which they all unite, one mighty stream, which swallows up the thousand rivulets, and mixes their undistinguishable waters, bearing the rich freight of the Holy Bible to men of all tribes and conditions. The forms of religion, under this view of the case, are not essentials, are not ends, but means. If they be essential, who is right, and what is the test of truth? If they are not essential, they are only to receive the consideration, which is due to means wisely adapted to ends proposed. But, as means, are they not all right, and working to the same end? and is

he not right, who believes in God, in the divine mission of Christ, and in its necessity, to exalt, to purify, and expand our affections,—who believes that Faith preceded the law to the salvation of men, or, more distinctly, that the abstract and impersonal reason, which I have elucidated, existing from all time, was as much a rule of action before the promulgation of the law, or the coming of Christ, as after; and that Melchisedek, the High Priest of this pure and absolute faith, was the representative of the Divine Reason, and as such “abideth a priest continually,” affirming the conclusion, that Revelation is but the promulgation of this divine and absolute Reason, perfected in the apotheosis of Christ, who destroyed the promulgated law, with its *conventional* ceremonies, and restored the ancient faith of Melchisedek? Is he not right, who thus thinks, and who, by the contemplation of TRUTH, purifies himself until his spirit is imbued with its light, which shines through the pure transparency of his life and manners, and yet deems it his duty to show, that his humble and pious life is the result of his convictions, and that it is not produced by the spirit nor the bondage of sectarianism?

But, let me not be misinterpreted nor misunderstood. He who attempts to walk by this light alone, in the present state of moral development, must be highly spiritual indeed, if he does not fall. We now exist with such an equipoise between good and evil, with such indomitable passions, and means of temptation, that we require an inflexibility of spirit more closely allied to insensibility than to virtue, or the discipline and open restraint of some visible Church, to give us habitual control over ourselves, and leave the moral feelings in their free and full activity.

The contemplation of impersonal reason compels a recurrence to fundamental truths in religion, and to such as are applicable to the conduct of life; and, from the individual man, there is but one step to society, and in society political results depend upon

private passions and opinions. Hence the importance of enlightened and liberal communities of men, whose minds have not been moulded, and grown cold in the rigid *forms* of the past. There are such men; history and our own experience declare it, and in every age of the world, where powers and privileges have been banded against rights, there have been the stationary party and the progressive to meet in collision; the former contending for the power in possession, for their special privileges and immunities. In the Eastern empires, this class may be distinguished as tyrants, and their fawning and servile sycophants; in Europe generally, as kings, and a distinctive nobility; in Venice, as the aristocracy, which repressed human thought and feeling under the terrible machinery of its espionage and leaden prisons. It is this party, in all communities, which separates itself from the masses in thought and feeling, and in the perpetuity of exclusive institutions, conferring conventional rights and exemptions, which are wrested from the masses, and which are claimed to be above those ordinary powers of legislation, which reach every individual in society. This is the stationary or aristocratic party, whose principles crush down the individual personality, chains it in ignorance, and imprisons it in the unyielding forms and legislation of the past. Its is the spirit which sacrifices the future to the present; principle to expediency; and the welfare of the whole to the narrow and selfish gratification of the individual. And he, who engages in the party collisions of the times, (and who dares be neutral in the contest between these *principles*?) and honestly sees the truth, will see the great interests of man are staked upon the issue, and that the monopolies and strong segregating measures of the stationary party, tariffs, fostering the few at the expense of the majority, internal improvements to build up favorite points and pervert the elective franchise, and a paper currency by the government, to be used or abused, as caprice or interest may dictate, and more than all, the princi-

ple, that you may construe our form of government to mean what cupidity may desire, or ambition prompt, — these, and all such principles, are forcing the government from its organic idea, and impelling it to centralism, to legislative and executive encroachment; and, when the power becomes sufficiently concentrated, to despotism, or the terrible workings of a revolution. Any construction of the constitution, which carries it from the few plain and simple objects, which induced its formation, will give to any party in administration, who choose to exercise them, powers to oppress, immunities from service, and exclusive advantages, which will not be extended to the masses; and so long as the people are neglected, or do not receive the full and appropriate blessings of legislation, they will be uninformed, “with weakness in all good, and strength in evil,” and may be made slaves and tools, to do the bloody work of future tyrants.

The ultimate tendencies of the democratic cause, (whatever may be the peculiar notions of individuals in its ranks,) are to the emancipation of thought and action from all improper and unnecessary shackles. The hopes inspired by our religion, the aspirations of our own nature, tuned to “dulcet symphonies” by the poets, and made the grounds of strong appeal by all who speak or preach, teach us, that a better order of things yet awaits our race; and who is it, that shall stay the progress of Omnipotent Will? Our progression is established in the decrees of eternity, and its reversal cannot be the work of man, and God will not lie, though the slow consummation of his purposes may cause the desponding to doubt, and the feeble to grow weary. Onward, — onward, is the movement of society, and as it goes forward, it embraces the whole family of man. It is not circumscribed by any locality; it is not fettered by any prejudice; it is not controlled by any exclusive principle; it is wide as the universe, — it reaches forward to eternity. Shall we, then, forget our Humanity, and live for ourselves,

for a creed, a mere party, while each turn of the wheel of life draws down those who are at the top of the circumference, and the car of the old Juggernaut, Time, prostrates and crushes them in the dust, whilst new fools of fashion in succession strive for the eminence, to be, in succession, made victims of their own fatuity? Such are the revolutions, and he, who legislates without directly intending the benefit of each and all, or who labors for his own personal aggrandizement, is forging chains, or adding weight to the fetters, which will bind and rivet the *majority of his own children* to inexorable bondage. Holding these considerations in view, it requires "courage, honesty, and intelligence, to make a thorough-going [democratic] partizan," and we have just passed through a convulsion in our own land, when it required courage to sustain, and moral honesty to avow, the straightforwardness of the Democratic measures, and to appeal to the "sober, second thought" of the people," and to sustain the appeal by an intelligent conviction, which has restored this party to the field of combat, almost beyond the chance of a defeat.

Nor need it be concealed, that forbearance for errors has been and must be exercised, which, where there are so many, who bring forward their special views, must at times creep in; but if forbearance is due to a great party for partial errors, to preserve its unity for the attainment of its general object, no toleration is due to those, who desert and betray a radical principle for a measure of alleged expediency. But no desertion can weaken, no treason can betray the free and onward course of liberal principles. "The stream of Democracy flows with a full tide," and every channel of communication is swelling to the brink with the fulness of its purifying and reviving waters, and through all the depths of the popular mind the vital and sustaining power is daily and hourly becoming transfused.

A change has come over the dream of empire. Throne and oligarchy, power and privilege, will be

trampled in the dust. A printer's boy has snatched the lightning from Heaven, and the sceptre from the hands of tyrants. An American mechanic has revolutionized the world by the application of steam, and an American *blacksmith* will chain the lightning to our cars. We will mount upon

“ Coursers, who are fed with the lightning
They drink of the whirlwind's stream ;
And when the red morning is bright'ning,
Will bathe in the fresh sunbeam ;
Will have strength for their swiftness, I deem.”

We are in the midst of a revolution. Old and hoary errors are passing away. The seal of doom is fixed upon power and privilege ; and from the laborers in their cornfields, the mechanics in their shops, yea, from the broad bosom of Humanity men are springing up to redeem, regenerate, and disenthral the race. As in the natural world the winds of heaven, and waves and currents of the ocean, distribute the seeds of each isle and continent ; so, silently and certainly, the good seed of truth springing up is borne on by the excitement and energy of the age ; and he, who looks beyond the outward covering of things to the not very remote consequences which lie beyond, will see the Spirit of Humanity presiding in meekness, yet in power, concentrating the energies of the age to the development of all the elements of intelligence and virtue, on which will be erected the only fabric of human happiness. Truth is evolved from error ; such is its history ; and political expediency, involving nations in moral guilt, teaches, by its frightful consequences, lessons which instruct man, exalt his character, and elevate his views, and we have yet to learn, whether our progress from error to truth is to be by the calm triumph of reason over prejudices and passions, or whether we shall be driven onward to the fulfilment of the great law of progress by political storms and convulsions.

- ART. IV. — *An Inquiry into the Cause of Social Evil ; with its Remedy. An Inaugural Address. Delivered July 8, 1839.* By ROBERT TOWNSEND, President of the Social Reform Society of New York. New York: 1839. 12mo. pp. 38.
2. *An Oration, delivered on the 4th of July, 1839, before the Citizens of Nashua, [N. H.] without distinction of party.* By SAMUEL OSGOOD. Nashua: Allen Beard. 1839. 8vo. pp. 40.
3. *An Address, delivered before the Democratic Citizens of Plymouth County, Mass., at East Abington, July 4, 1839.* By SETH J. THOMAS. Boston: Beals & Greene. 8vo. pp. 52.
4. *An Oration, delivered before the Democratic Citizens of the North part of Middlesex County, at Groton, July 4, 1839.* By JOHN P. TARBELL. Lowell: Abijah Watson. 1839. 8vo. pp. 24.

THE first pamphlet on our list is a tract, issued by a society for social reform in the city of New York, of which society we know nothing, and have no wish to know anything. We do not see any call for social reform societies. There are already so many associations for religious, social, and philanthropic objects, that we can rarely find an individual with a sense of individual independence, and responsibility. The pamphlet, however, is respectable. We know nothing personally of its author, Mr. Townsend, but his Address speaks well for his talent, acquirements, and philanthropic feelings. His views strike us as being in general just and well-timed.

The second pamphlet enumerated is from the pen of a young clergyman of great promise, and is written, for the most part, with rare beauty and power. It clearly defines and ably sustains the democratic principle. It, however, shuns all allusion to what may be considered democratic measures, and democratic men. Mr. Osgood, as a clergyman, may think that he is not required to take a very decided party

stand, but he seems to recommend on principle all wise and good men to keep as much aloof from party as possible. He appears to adopt for his motto, "principles, — not measures, nor men."

The third pamphlet is from a plain, self-made democrat, who makes no pretensions to literary culture. But his Address is written with great clearness and force, and is an eloquent and able vindication of the principles and measures of the democratic party. Mr. Thomas possesses a strong mind, is a sound logician, and is fitted to be a popular political writer.

Mr. Tarbell's Oration is also a defence of the democratic principles and measures. It is sound in its doctrine, and in some passages genuinely eloquent. Mr. Tarbell is a young man, who somewhat distinguished himself last winter, as a member of our General Court. As a writer he wants practice. His Oration smacks too much of the strained, the affected style, for which Fourth of July Orations have been but too remarkable. He will do much more honor to himself by cherishing a severer taste, and adopting a simpler style of oratory. Homer, we have heard it said, was not less remarkable for simplicity, than for sublimity. Our American writers are too apt to get on stilts, which makes them appear rather awkward. The truly great man goes calmly to his work, is always self-possessed, always unaffected, and able to breathe an air of repose, of quiet dignity over all his productions.

All these pamphlets show that their authors belong to the movement party, and that they are looking forward with the eye of hope to great and important changes in man's social condition; and what has pleased us even more than this is the fact, that, whatever meliorations of society they may anticipate or struggle for, they evidently expect them from the more perfect application of Christian principles to man's social and political relations. They all apparently cherish the conviction, that democracy is nothing but the political application of Christianity; and not one of them seems to dream of hitching the car of reform

on to that of infidelity. This to us is a cheering fact, a proof that our social reformers are beginning to take juster views of religion, and that the friends of religion are beginning to feel more deeply, that their faith requires them to labor for man's earthly well-being.

Some ten or twelve years ago, there were indications, that the cause of social reform in this country would be connected with that of disbelief in the Gospel. The attention of the American people was first seriously called to the defects of all existing social organizations, and to the importance and duty of laboring for social progress, by Robert Owen, his son Robert Dale Owen, Miss Frances Wright, and others, whose shallow philosophy was represented in the "Free Enquirer," and the "Lectures on Knowledge." The Owens and Miss Wright produced a profound sensation; they quickened many a young heart, and recalled enthusiasm to many an old man, who had fondly dreamed that his labors for this world were over. They were the immediate occasion of the workingmen's movements, which took place in various parts of the country, cheering some and alarming others; and they have contributed not a little to that general examination into the actual state of American society, which has been for some time going on amongst us. This is the good side of their influence. But unhappily, these generous and philanthropic foreigners had no just appreciation of the Gospel, and assigned no place to religion in the new order of things they sought to bring about. They considered religion, even in its purity, a vulgar superstition, they looked upon it as favoring priestcraft and tyranny, and as hostile to all exertions for the improvement of society. They wished to brush it out of the way, recall men from the contemplation of another world, compel them to limit their hopes and affections to the narrow compass of this life, so that their attention should not be distracted from their earthly dwelling, and so that they might be left free to labor for its embellishment. The world, said they,

lies waste ; society is infested with noxious weeds, overgrown with thistles and brambles, because men have neglected this world for another. They must, therefore, leave the world after death, cease to be amused with dreams of paradise, or alarmed by dreams of tophet, and think only of making the earth the abode of peace, love, and happiness.

This was their doctrine, and there was apparently some danger, that it would spread further than the safety of the commonwealth would permit. The Owens and Miss Wright did not oppose religion on its own account. They disdained to concern themselves with so vulgar a subject. It became worthy of their opposition, only inasmuch as it appeared to them to be an impediment to the social progress they were desirous of realizing. But, there were others amongst us, who were opposed to what they called religion, on its own account. They were infidels, rather than social reformers. They believed in disbelief, and had a creed to propagate. Such were the late leader of the *Free Enquirers* in this city, and his more prominent friends. These men saw the strong democratic tendency of the American people, and fancied, that if they could bring about a union between infidelity and radical democracy, they should be able, by means of the popularity of the democracy, to make infidelity triumph. Here was a deep-laid scheme ; and there were many things, which seemed to favor its success. Most of the champions of the people in the old world had been, and were at war with religious establishments ; the French democrats, with La Fayette at their head, were claimed to a man to be infidels. In our own country, the father of American democracy, Thomas Jefferson, was looked upon as an unbeliever ; Washington's orthodoxy was said to be questionable ; the elder Adams was at best a heretic, and Franklin, in early life, an infidel, and there was no proof that he had ever changed his opinions. Add to this, the clergy, — especially the clergy of New England, and of the more influential sects, — were pretty generally found

on the side against the democracy. They had opposed Jefferson, they had opposed Madison and the War, and were at best indifferent to the subject of social progress. From these facts, it was not worse logic than often obtains to infer, on the one hand, that, to be thorough-going democrats, we must be infidels, and on the other hand, to be thorough-going Christians, we must uphold social abuses.

But happily the dark cloud has passed, or is now passing away. The reformers are now pretty generally coming to the conclusion, that infidelity is a mere negative force, and can effect no solid, enduring reform; and that Christianity, originally taught by a carpenter's son, and, under the providence of God, propagated by fishermen and tent-makers, declaring all men equal in the sight of God, and, therefore, equal to one another, so far from tending to uphold social abuses, commands us, with all the authority of God, to labor for the elevation of the masses, and permits us to hope for heaven only on the ground, that we have fed the hungry, given drink to the thirsty, clothed the naked, visited the sick, and unloosed the captive. Christianity is the very creed of the reformer; its spirit is the spirit of reform itself; and the unbelievers who are laboring for a reform, are unconsciously obeying it.

We consider this a great gain. It is a result, that we have been many years laboring, apparently almost alone, to bring about, and we can but rejoice, that in this direction our labors are no longer needed. By understanding that the social reformer, the friend of the "largest liberty," may also be the truest and most pious Christian, we do away with an antagonism, which has heretofore been injurious to both religion and social progress. We effect by this a union, from which we may look for the noblest offspring. We bring the whole force of the religious sentiment, the strongest sentiment in our nature, and the source, or the ally of all our generous and disinterested affections, — we bring the whole force of this sentiment,

and the whole authority of the church, to strengthen the reformer; while we bring the whole force of our love of freedom, our desire to perfect social institutions, of the whole democratic movement of the age, to the aid of religion and the church. It is, in fact, a sort of realization of the atonement, a bringing together, if we may so speak, of God and man. It unites the instinct of a Deity with the instinct of Humanity, and gives us the God-man, in whom is redemption from all sin.

The reconciliation between Christians and reformers is now virtually effected. Religion is taking a social direction, and reform is becoming spiritual. On the side of progress, and especially social progress, we see the most advanced philosophy of the age, and the noblest creations of literature. Philosophy, literature, art, religion, all with us, are enlisting in the service of the democracy. This is well. It is encouraging to the true philanthropist. But, there is a still further reconciliation, which we wish to see brought about. We wish to see the union consummated between the reformers and the democratic party, so called. We contend, and it is the purpose of this article to prove, that it is the interest and the duty of the friends of progress, in whatever direction, to unite cordially with the democratic party, so called, and to give it all the support in their power. The ends they have in view, so far as they are practicable, will be obtained by so doing, and they can obtain them by no other method.

It is not pretended by anybody, that all who are contending for the progress of Humanity act with the democratic party. There is among us a large number of educated and intelligent men, who have outgrown the old-fashioned Federalism, in which they were reared. These men now take broad and generous views of human nature; they have protested against old forms, against conventionalisms and factitious distinctions, which make enemies of brethren; they have seen the necessity, and believe in the practica-

bility of great social meliorations; but they cannot bring themselves to coöperate with the democratic party. They have been accustomed, from their earliest life, to look upon it as made up of a disorderly rabble, led on by unprincipled demagogues, and they cannot stoop to enter its ranks. They like the democratic principles, claim to be thorough-going democrats themselves, and would be much hurt, should we deny them the democratic name; they even like, and some of them profess to approve, the more prominent and leading measures of the democratic party; but then the democratic men, the men, what pure-minded, philanthropic, enlightened, disinterested Christian and patriot can associate with them? A difficult question no doubt to answer. But, we apprehend, a little more intimate acquaintance with the democratic men, would soften this repugnance somewhat. Furthermore, with the most profound respect for these men, we must suggest, that their democratic progress has not been quite so great as they fancy. The democratic party embraces the majority of the people of the United States. To complain of the party as these men do, is but saying, that the majority of the people of the United States are unworthy to be the party associates of a man of respectability. This is not very complimentary, and we suspect they who say so still retain a considerable portion of the leaven of the Pharisees, of which they would do well to get rid as soon as possible. And lastly, if the democratic party is composed of such a worthless rabble, there is but so much the greater necessity that these good and wise men should enter its ranks, so that it may have some virtue whereof to boast. If all good men keep aloof from the party, is it possible that it should be composed entirely of good men and true?

We are aware, that we have many excellent men among us, who entertain a most lively repugnance to party, and party action. We ourselves, without claiming either matchless wisdom or immaculate virtue,

have all our life long declaimed against party. But a little practical acquaintance with the affairs of the world, and some reflection on the laws which control the action of society, have finally convinced us, that whatever be our aversion to party, parties are inevitable, and will be till all men become perfect, or until a uniformity of opinion is brought about by means of absolute despotism. Doubtless, no man should seek party for party's sake; but whoso would take a part with his fellow-men in the management of what concerns the public good, must act with a party, unless he fancies himself capable of constituting, in himself alone, a party strong enough to cope with all existing parties.

Parties are not arbitrary creations. They are called forth and sustained by higher laws than any of human enactment. They are inseparable from the imperfect development of Humanity, and will ever be a source of complaint to those, who think more of the end to be gained, than of the power which is created in struggling to gain an end. It was the will of Providence to make man an imperfect being, to give him his point of departure in weakness and ignorance. As an indemnity for this, he gave him the capacity for illimitable progress. Parties grow, on the one hand, out of this imperfection, and on the other, out of the unfolding of this capacity. Society, in its various institutions, is but the reflex of human nature. Contemplated at any given epoch, it merely marks the point to which the progress of Humanity has attained. It must, therefore, at any given epoch, fall just as far short of perfection, as human nature at that epoch falls short of its complete development. A portion of every community will be more alive to this imperfection than the rest, and also more confident in the power of human nature to advance. These will constitute a movement party, or party of the future; the rest of the community, either satisfied with things as they are, or destitute of faith in man's power of progress, will constitute the stationary or stand-still

party. In some epochs, in some countries, the first of these parties will be in a feeble minority ; in others, it will be in a majority, as it is at present in this country. The first of these parties with us is called the democratic party, the other is denominated the whig party. These two parties have existed among us from the first settlement of our country ; and analogous parties may be found in every country that possesses freedom enough to allow of any mental activity. We must accept them, or abandon our freedom.

The democratic party is, no doubt, an imperfect embodiment of the great idea of progress. Nobody pretends, that it is faultless. It would be saying not a little for the American people, to say, that the majority of them constitute a party, which has not a single fault. It would also be virtually saying, that we have no further progress to make, that we have realized the idea of our institutions, finished our work, and have nothing before us, but to die. The democratic party, doubtless, partakes of all the faults of the country, and shares in all the imperfections which belong to our stage in the general progress of Humanity ; but it represents what is most advanced in our condition. Its virtues are always the living virtues of the times, and its intelligence, that which reaches farthest into the future, and which is to be for the longest time to come the dominant intelligence. The virtues of its enemies will be always the virtues which were most in repute yesterday, and its intelligence that which was novel, and truly admirable in our fathers.

But our friends, with whom we are at this moment engaged, doubt much of this, and tell us, that, although they do not like to be enrolled in the stand-still party, or, if you please, the party of yesterday, they cannot consent to join the democratic party. It is too coarse, too vulgar. It wants refinement, elevation, high moral aims, and disinterested affections. Let us have, say they, a third party, composed of vir-

tuous and enlightened men, who will labor for the public good, without any reference to their own interest. This is very fine. Who would not like to be a member of such a party? But on what principle shall we call forth such a party? What shall be its watch-word, its rallying cry? You can call forth a third party only when there is some great and pressing interest, which the two existing parties neglect. Is there such an interest in this country? If so, what is it? If this interest relate to progress, then it is an interest for the democratic party to take up, and if that party has not yet taken it up, what should be the inference, but that the country is not yet prepared to act upon it? If it be an interest opposed to progress, there is already your stand-still party, your whig party, to espouse it. If the question concern merely its discussion, it can be discussed in the bosom of that existing party, whose general principles embrace it, and it will not cost more time or trouble to bring that party, as a party, to act on it, than it will to raise up a new party, sufficiently large to act on it with effect.

Moreover, we wish to be informed whence we are to obtain all these excellent men, who are to make up our third party. If the third party be but a minority, it will not be able to accomplish much. If the two parties now existing are so corrupt as to render a third necessary, whence can we obtain good men enow to constitute a party, which shall embrace a majority of the people of the United States? We are speaking to reformers, who, of course, wish their third party to be a party of progress. Its recruits, then, must be taken from the democratic party, as the members of the whig party are not in favor of progress. So, if your third party rise to a majority, it will be little else than the present democratic party under a new name. Will a change of name change its character? Judging from what we know of our whig friends, who have had considerable experience in this matter of changing names, we should infer not.

A few years ago there was organized amongst us what was called the workingmen's party. We know something of that party, for we were among its earliest friends and supporters, and have made some sacrifices for it. So far as it raised up certain questions for discussion, and so far as it called the attention of our countrymen more immediately to the interests and rights of labor, it was not without its results. But, where is the party now? Has it failed because its leaders betrayed it, because the American people have reprobated its doctrines, or because there was not virtue and intelligence enough in the laboring classes to sustain it? Not at all. No party is, or ever can be betrayed by its leaders, if it have a living principle for its basis. When a Benedict Arnold undertakes to betray the cause of American liberty, he merely betrays himself, and obtains everlasting infamy. Your Washingtons always arrive in time to prevent the threatened mischief, and to disconcert all the plans of the traitor. The cause of American liberty goes on, conquering and to conquer, for it contains in itself the seminal principle of victory. Nor have the American people reprobated the doctrines put forth by the workingmen. So far as these doctrines were applicable to our present stage of development, they have been accepted, and do now constitute an integral portion of the democratic creed, as we may learn from the nickname, *loco foco*, given to the democracy by their enemies. Nor have the workingmen failed for the want of sufficient virtue and intelligence to sustain a party. They yield to no portion of our population in either. It is no rare thing to find an ordinary mechanic able to refute Mr. Webster's "Great Speech" on the currency question. The true cause of failure should be sought in the fact, that there was no general and permanent demand for such a party. The population, which could be enlisted in such a party, were not numerous enough to make it sufficiently powerful to accomplish anything. Its doctrines, so far as they were true and immediately practicable,

were parallel with those of the democratic party. The few social abuses which gave rise to the party were of a local nature, and were scarcely felt out of our cities and large towns. Few, therefore, could be drawn into the party, except journeyman mechanics, and, in fact, but a small portion of these. But, could all these have been enlisted, they would have constituted but a feeble minority, compared with the whole population of the country. The great body of the agricultural population was not to be enlisted. These constituted the main portion of the democratic party, so called. They were democrats, but democrats in the sense in which the party itself was democratic. They had not outgrown their party, and could not outgrow it; for being, as it were, the party itself, that must needs advance just in proportion as they advanced. The agricultural population, therefore, could see no necessity of separating from the democratic party for the purpose of uniting with the journeymen mechanics of the towns. If they approved the measures contended for by the mechanics, they could support them without leaving their party, or deserting the principles, which constituted its basis. Here is the true cause of the failure of the workingmen's party, as a party. Similar causes will always be found to check the growth of every third party which comes up. Its doctrines and measures must needs be, in this country, parallel with those of one or the other of the two existing parties, with which they will very soon become coincident. The workingmen are now an integral portion of the democratic party, if they did but know it, and a separate party organization is out of the question.

The Reformers, then, whether we mean the workingmen, or the other class of whom we have spoken, must see, it strikes us, the utter inutility and impracticability of attempting to raise up a third party. A third party is not wanted. Nothing can be gained by means of such a party, which cannot be gained just as well without it. And, moreover, it is utterly impossi-

ble to raise up such a party, that shall last for any length of time, or be powerful enough to effect anything. The proper course is for both of these classes to join and support one or the other of the two existing parties.

We are addressing ourselves to reformers, to men, who profess to believe in progress, and to be desirous of laboring in the holy cause of social melioration. Can they hesitate, which party to join, when the alternative is to join one or the other of the two existing parties? We have no disposition to speak disparagingly of the whig party. In that party are many men whom we are proud to reckon among our personal friends. We freely acknowledge, that it embodies much talent, and not a little private worth. But every party, if it be worth considering, has a set of principles, which it must develop, and which it is compelled, by the laws of Providence, to push to their last consequences. These principles are stronger than individuals. They carry away individuals, in spite of themselves. There is an invincible logic, which conquers the stubbornest will. He, who refuses to go where the principles of his party lead, is inevitably left by the way, and he, who steps before his party to arrest its onward career, is swept away by a resistless current, or trampled in the dust by a thousand feet. To judge of a party, you need not to inquire what are the private virtues of the individuals which compose it, but, what are the principles on which it is founded, the idea around which it rallies, and which it is its mission to realize. This idea, nakedly presented, may be repudiated by a large portion of the party, few of the party may comprehend it, or will its realization; nevertheless, they must all obey it, and nearly all will ultimately adopt its last consequences.

The idea of the whig party in this country is of yesterday, not of to-day, far less of to-morrow. The party is the anti-progress party. Its doctrines were doctrines of progress once, but they are not now.

They were proper, once, to be supported, and were the doctrines of the movement party. In the progress of Humanity, there was a period, when it was necessary to bring up the interests of what may be termed commercial capital, against landed capital, which was almost exclusively possessed by an hereditary and titled nobility. Then the whig party was the party of progress; and where it is still necessary to break down an aristocracy founded on the rights of birth and the sword, and monopolizing the greater part of the soil, the whig party is even now the party of progress, because its principles are the proper antagonist of the principles of such an aristocracy. Hence, in England, in 1688, and subsequently, the true friends of progress sided with the whigs, because the whigs were against the old hereditary, landed aristocracy of the kingdom. They supported the Bank, the Funds, the Merchants, and the East India Company. But their doctrines were tolerable only for a time, only so long as it was necessary to humble the landed or military aristocracy.

Now this state of things has never existed with us, and never can exist here. The English nobleman, or rather the old feudal baron is represented in this country, it is true, but he is represented by the American farmer, whose estate is so cut up and parcelled out among his brother barons, that he no longer possesses any undue preponderance in the commonwealth. The capital invested in the soil has with us not even its legitimate share of influence. The commercial capital, the capital employed in business operations, is the preponderating power. To give it additional weight, is, therefore, to war against the true interests of Humanity. The party, which labors to do this, is not, and cannot be, in this country, the party of progress. But the leading idea of the whig party is the preponderance of commercial capital. As the old English whigs supported the Bank of England, so they support the Bank of the United States; as the old English whigs supported the merchants, corporations, funding systems, so our American whigs support the same. The

American whigs possess the larger portion of the commercial capital of the country, and they contend, that, therefore, they ought to control the government of the country. They ask, with the celebrated Addison, in his "Whig-Examiner," is there anything more reasonable, than that they, who have all the riches of the nation in their possession, or that they, who have already *engrossed* all our riches, should have the management of our public treasure, and the direction of our fleets and armies?" This question might be very proper, if our work were to put down an aristocracy founded on birth and the sword, like the old feudal aristocracy; but it indicates the worst possible system, here, where our work is to raise up Man, and give him the preëminence over Money.

The whig party also is a foreign party, and anti-American in its principles. Its policy and movements are necessarily controlled, not by a regard to true American interests, but by a regard to the interests of the "credit system," which the party is wedded to, of which the Bank of England is the common centre, and whose ramifications extend to all parts of the globe. By commerce and manufactures, by their various business operations, which are carried on mainly by means of credits, they are intimately connected with this system, and virtually enslaved by it. We should be asking more than our knowledge of the weakness of human nature warrants, were we to ask them, in case of collision between this "credit system" and their country, to be faithful to the latter. Where a man's treasure is, there will be his heart also. Their treasure is in the "credit system," the principal seat of which is not in this country; consequently their hearts are abroad, rather than at home. So long as the "credit system" is controlled by foreign nations, or in other words, so long as our country is not the first commercial nation of the world, support of the system must be incompatible with patriotism. England is, at present, the ruling commercial nation; she controls the credit system, so far as

it can be controlled; and consequently controls all who are dependent on it. In case of collision between this country and Great Britain, during the existence of the "credit system," we must always look to see all true whigs sustaining Great Britain, as its grand supporter, although her "cannon should be battering down the walls of our Capitol," — resolving, that it is unbecoming a moral and religious people to rejoice at American victories over her armies, and singing *Te Deums*, whenever her mercenaries succeed in suppressing the democratic movements of the Old World. We must expect them to do this, for the system they have espoused will compel them to do it; and they will do it spontaneously, religiously, with the feeling, that in so doing they are honoring God, and serving man. Whiggism with us is, therefore, incompatible with patriotism. The whig virtually expatriates himself, or rather, forswearing the land of his birth, adopts the "credit system" as his country, makes it his home, in it erects his altar, and places his household gods. When that system coincides with American principles, he is an American; when they do not, he is an Englishman, a Frenchman, a Chinaman, or one of that nation, with whose interests, for the time being, they chance to be coincident.

Mr. Biddle, who is not altogether destitute of patriotic feelings, had, we apprehend, a glimpse of this fact, and hence his efforts to transfer the seat of the credit system from London to Philadelphia. He probably dreamed of making the American merchants, through the Bank of the United States, all that English merchants now are through the Bank of England. This was a lofty ambition, only a single remove from the sublime. All that was wanting for its complete success was, that this country should stand first in the scale of commercial nations, a rank it unfortunately does not hold, and will not, for some considerable time to come. So long as this country is only a second or third-rate commercial nation, it cannot be the principal seat of the "credit system." So long as it re-

tains its present position in relation to Great Britain, a Bank of the United States can only be a branch of the Bank of England. The Bank of England, as the great centre of the credit system of the world, can, at any moment it chooses, ruin the credit of American merchants, and crush our whole banking system, as past experience fully demonstrates. By the intimate connexion, which has heretofore existed between the fiscal concerns of our government, and the general business of banking, we have, government and all, been virtually under the control of Great Britain. Hence, the reason why, whenever we have demanded justice of Great Britain, we have uniformly armed our business men against our own government. The war, which we have been carrying on against the banking system for the last ten years, has been really a war for national independence, and General Jackson, in warring against the Bank, was fighting in the same cause in which he fought at New Orleans, and against the same enemy. It was therefore that the people, by an unerring instinct, selected him, the hero of New Orleans, to be their chief in the new campaigns, of which they had a forefeeling.

The whig party is also the anti-Christian party. We mean not by this, that all whigs reject Christianity, but that whiggism embraces certain principles, which the party are developing, and which they will, if they meet with no counteracting force from without, push to their last results; and that these principles do necessarily involve the rejection of our holy religion, and can end in nothing short of infidelity and universal skepticism. This is ascertained from the whig doctrines on the origin and nature of government, on the origin of ideas, and on the grounds of faith.

The Christian doctrine is, that government is of divine origin, and rests for its legitimacy on the authority of God. This, we take it, is the meaning of that famous passage of St. Paul, "the powers that be are ordained of God." The apostle, we apprehend, was not so much intent on asserting the divine

appointment of the then or any actually ruling magistrates, as on asserting the divine institution of government itself, as the foundation of the virtue of loyalty, which he was enforcing. According to Christianity, man is bound to obey no authority, but that of God; consequently, he can owe allegiance to no earthly government, unless it be of divine ordination. Either, then, give up the duty of obedience, and consequently, all government, or assert that government is of divine origin. It is oppression, it is rank tyranny, to compel me to obey my fellow-man. To this as a Christian I will not submit, for I have but one master, and he is in heaven. Consequently all governments resting on human authority are illegitimate, are usurpations; their acts are not, and cannot be, laws; and, therefore, they can never have the right to demand, much less to coerce, obedience.

On this ground, which, if we rightly comprehend it, is that of the most perfect freedom, the whole Christian Church has ever taken its stand. The Catholic Church has always taught the princes, that they have no right to reign in their own name, but that they must reign as the servants, the deputies of God. Bossuet thundered in the ears of the "Grand Monarque" himself, that kings reign only by the authority which they receive from God, and are as much bound to obey God, as the meanest of their subjects. King James, in his Remonstrance for the Right of Kings, is merely defending the divine right of civil government against the exclusive claims of the Pope in favor of the Church. He would merely show, that kings receive their crowns from as high and as sacred a source as the bishops do their mitres. The great idea which was in the minds of the advocates of the divine right of kings, and of passive obedience, who fill so much space in the history of England during the seventeenth century and the first part of the eighteenth, was that mere human authority is not obligatory on man, that allegiance to a king is due only on the ground, that he is the representative of the will of God. They

dared not declare the king's will the law, and teach men, that they were bound to obey it. The king was to be obeyed only as the Lieutenant of the Almighty; consequently God only was in reality acknowledged as the sovereign. This, at the moment, was supposed to favor the doctrine of absolutism, and to clothe the tyrant with divine authority. In this sense it was urged. It was, no doubt, urged against subjects, in favor of kings; but who sees not, that it may be urged with equal force against kings, in favor of the people? Government is of divine appointment; and because it is of divine appointment, you are bound to obey it; therefore, obey the king. Stop there, if you please. We admit your premises, but deny your conclusion. We believe government is a divine ordinance, and that we are bound to obey God; but prove to us, that the king is God's Lieutenant, that God speaks through him, for this is not quite so clear to us. But be this as it may, that civil government is of divine origin, and is, for this reason, and this reason alone, obligatory, endowed with the right to exact obedience, is the great idea, which lies at the bottom of the doctrines of the divine right of kings, and passive obedience, and of their apparent antipodes, the Fifth Monarchy men in England, Samuel Gorton, Roger Williams, and others, in our early colonial days, and the Non-Resistants and No-Government men of our own times. This doctrine, however it may have been perverted to the purposes of tyranny, or anarchy, is in fact the only solid and enduring ground, on which government can be established, for it is the only ground, on which the legitimacy of government can be maintained, and disloyalty made a crime *in foro conscientiae*. It is also the only ground, on which freedom can be safely rested; for freedom consists, not in the absence of restraint, but in being subjected to no restraint but the will of God.

Let no one start at the doctrine we here put forth. We all feel, that the word of God is our supreme law. This word is truth, is justice, is love, whatever we

conceive of the highest. How it has been or may be uttered, we do not now inquire. Whether it has pealed in thunders from heaven upon the ears of startled Humanity, and been caught up and recorded in a book, or whether it has sounded out in that voice, which comes to us from all nature, declaring its wondrous beauty and harmony, and revealing the law by which it is governed, or whether it has been whispered to the soul in its moments of quiet, in the still small voice of conscience; or whether it has been, as we believe, uttered in all these ways, is foreign to our present purpose. God is the Creator of the Universe, he is its sovereign, and his word, whether speaking through hierarchies, monarchies, aristocracies, democracies, inspired prophets, or the reason with which we are endowed, is our supreme law, and obedience to this, and this alone, is freedom. No man feels, that he is oppressed, because he is bound to conform to truth, to obey justice, to be holy; and to conform to truth, to obey justice, to be holy, is precisely what is meant, if we understand ourselves, by obedience to the will of God.

Now whiggism denies the divine origin of government. It gives it a human origin, and founds it on contract, a bargain, wherein it is stipulated by the magistrates, of the first party, that they will rule, govern, command the people, and by the people, of the second party, that they will consent to be ruled, governed, and commanded by the aforesaid magistrates of the first party. The idea of a contract, whatever may be its terms, evidently assigns to government a human origin, and admits no authority above that of man. Government demands loyalty, but loyalty is due only to that which is above us. How, then, can we be loyal towards a government, which is the work of our own hands, and which originates in a bargain, which we ourselves have made?

This doctrine of the mere human origin of government was introduced into England by Hobbes, if we remember aright, and it was taken up and enlarged

upon by John Locke, the apostle and philosopher of whiggism. Hobbes regarded man merely as susceptible of pain and pleasure, and assigned him no other rule of morality than that of seeking the last and avoiding the first. He talks of a state of nature, prior to the institution of civil society, in which all men are equal; and which, in consequence of this equality among men, is a state of war. The design of civil society is to put an end to this war, and maintain a state of peace. As war is the greatest of evils, so peace is the greatest of blessings, and cannot be purchased at too high a price. Mankind become convinced of this, and institute civil government, and surrender to it all their natural rights, clothe it with absolute power, that it may preserve them thenceforth in a state of peace. Locke's idea is similar. He contends, with Hobbes, for a state of nature, regards it as a state of war, and supposes, that men, by a voluntary and deliberate act, instituted civil government. In instituting this government, he supposes the people gave up a certain portion of their rights to government, that they might enjoy the rest in peace and safety. He is less liberal to government than Hobbes, for he does not allow the surrender of *all* our rights, only in fact as many as are necessary to clothe the government with the requisite power to fulfil its functions. But government, according to him, has no authority, but what is derived from the terms of the original bargain. Its rights are merely the rights of individuals, voluntarily surrendered to it. This makes it of mere human authority. Obedience to government, then, is obedience to a human power. According to this theory, I am obliged to obey man, which is slavery, instead of God, as Christianity teaches, which is freedom.

But in their doctrine on the origin of ideas, the whig party are still further removed from Christianity. Christianity requires a belief in a supersensual world, a world of reality, which lies back of the world of merely sensible forms and logical deductions. By the

senses, we look out upon the material world ; but if we have no eye by which we can look in upon the world of reason, and take cognizance of God and Duty, Christianity has for us no certain ground of evidence, and its truth is in no way perceptible. The world, it professes to reveal, it does not reveal, because there is nothing in us, which can perceive it. The Christian, talking to us of his spiritual world, is as one talking of colors to a man born blind.

Now, what is the whig doctrine on the origin of ideas ? Hobbes and Locke are here again our authority. They are the politicians of the whigs, and their politics grow out of their metaphysics. Hobbes assigns man two faculties, force and cognition. The cognitive faculty is merely sensation ; for he admits no source of knowledge but the senses. Hence his nominalism, his denial of the reality of all abstract ideas. General, universal, eternal, infinite, are in his philosophy mere words, which serve to abridge discourse, but which name no realities. Locke's doctrine is but a modification of the same. Locke allows two sources of knowledge, sensation and reflection. From sensation we derive all our primary ideas, on which reflection subsequently acts. Through the senses we receive notices of the external world merely. Reflection adds to these notices simply a knowledge of the mind's own operations. According to Locke, therefore, we can take cognizance of no existences, but those of the external world, and ourselves. We can, then, have no knowledge of the world Christianity professes to reveal. That world is neither ourselves, nor the external world. Nor can it be a deduction of logic from either. Logic can deduce from the data furnished it, only what those data contain. External nature and ourselves are evidently both finite. They, then, neither of them, nor both of them, contain the infinite. Then the infinite cannot be deduced from them. Then, for us, the infinite does not exist. Then Christianity, as a professed revelation of the infinite, can receive no faith from us.

This is the inevitable result, if we start with Hobbes and Locke. Hobbes was aware of this, and scarcely disguises it. Locke, who was a man of some religious feeling, and never disposed to push matters to extremes, does not appear to have perceived it. He was a religious man, and professed faith in Christianity; but he pared his faith down to the smallest point compatible with any faith at all. He disrobed our religion of all its mysteries; and in endeavoring to show it *reasonable*, endeavored to make it, as he had government, a mere human authority; for in his philosophy reason is human, not the word of God, "which was in the beginning, which was with God, and which was God." He admitted another life, but asserted that we can have no proof of it, but an outward revelation, authenticated by miracles addressed to the senses; and, though he did not assert the materiality of the soul, he thought it not unreasonable to suppose, that God might confer on matter the power of thinking. Virtue with him was an empty name; pleasure the supreme good; and in his "Private Thoughts," he declares, that the end, a man should always have in view, is the promotion of his own happiness.

The consequences of this doctrine of Locke have been none of the best. On this point, Shaftesbury, his friend and pupil, and also, under other relations, an eminent whig, is good authority. "Although I honor infinitely," he says, "the other writings of Locke, whom I knew, and for whose sincere faith in Christianity I can answer, I am, nevertheless, forced to confess, that he took the same route that Hobbes did, and that he has been followed by Tindal, and other free thinkers of our times. It was Locke himself who struck the fatal blow, for the known character of Hobbes, and his slavish principles, by discrediting his philosophy, deprived it of its poison. But Locke struck the very basis of the edifice, *banished all order and all virtue from the world, placed out of nature ideas which are intimately blended with those of the Divin-*

ity itself, and asserted that they had no foundation in the human mind." In England, we know Locke has produced Tindal, Toland, Collins, Chubbs, Morgan, Mandeville, Woolston, Hume, Hartley, Dodwell, Darwin, Priestley, Belsham; in France, Voltaire, Condillac, Diderot, Helvetius, D'Holbach, Volney, and many others of nearly equal notoriety; and in this country, Norton and Palfrey. Some of these, it is true, have professed, and no doubt entertained, a sort of faith in Christianity, and several of them, by virtue of one of those sublime inconsistencies, which do so much honor to human nature, have been generous defenders of liberty; but they have all denied us all intuition of a spiritual world, and most of them have questioned, or denied all existences, but such as fall under the senses. According to them all, we can have no certain knowledge of the truth of Christianity. Of what we are not certain we must doubt. Consequently, we must always doubt the truth of Christianity. We find this conclusion expressed in still stronger terms by an eminent ex-professor in the Theological School of Cambridge University, a firm adherent of Locke's philosophy, and as good authority as can be desired on its actual tendency. Mr. Norton, the gentleman of whom we speak, says, in his late publication, entitled "The Latest Form of Infidelity," "To the demand for certainty, let it come from whom it may, I answer, that I know of no absolute certainty, beyond the limit of momentary consciousness, a certainty that vanishes the instant it exists, and is lost in the regions of metaphysical doubt. * * * There can be no intuition, no direct perception of the truth of Christianity." This is strong language, plain and unequivocal; and it exhibits, we must needs think, not merely the "latest," but also a very old "form of Infidelity." There can be no direct perception of the truth of Christianity. There can, it seems, be no certainty, but that of momentary consciousness. Mr. Norton has not had even a momentary consciousness of the fact of the Divine Mission of Jesus; and if he could

have had such a consciousness at any period of his life, it would have "vanished the instant it existed, and been lost in the regions of metaphysical doubt." But we have, and can have, no absolute certainty. Then all inquiry, concerning the evidence of any subject, resolves itself into a balancing of probabilities. Nay, how can we be sure, that this or that is probable, if there be no certainty for us? If we say there can be no absolute certainty, we must accept universal skepticism, and go so far as even to

"Doubt, if it doubt itself be doubting."

This anti-Christian character of the party in question will show itself, perhaps, still more clearly, if we advert to its doctrine on the grounds of Faith. The Christian doctrine on the grounds of religious faith is, that man, unassisted by the inspiration of the Almighty, is incapable of discovering the objects of religious faith; but, with the assistance of Divine inspiration, which, to a certain extent, is vouchsafed to all men, he is able to perceive and know the objects, the spiritual realities of that world which Christianity professes to reveal. The soul has an eye, which looks in upon that world, by means of which it sees and knows it, as certainly as it knows the sensations produced in it by means of the objects of sense. The Church implies this in its doctrine of experimental religion. It teaches us, that, in experimental religion, we see and know the truth of Christianity. We do not merely believe the simple fact, that there is a spiritual world, but we become acquainted with it, know it, even better than we know the world of sense. Ask the true Christian, if Christianity be true, and he answers, it is true, and he knows it is true, because he *feels* it is true. Hence it is, that we are exhorted in Scripture, not merely to believe there is a God, but to make ourselves acquainted with him, and be at peace, and are assured, that it is life eternal to know the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom he hath sent. When the soul perceives the truths of religion, it knows

them, and at once recognizes them as truths. It asks not for arguments to prove them. It has the witness within itself. There is a divinity within, that receives the message which God sends, responds to it, and vouches for its truth. This we regard as the Christian doctrine, and it is, in substance, what has been the prevailing doctrine of the Church, from its birth, down to our own times.

But the party we are speaking of adopting Locke's philosophy, which denies that the human mind can take cognizance of any existences but those of the outward world and itself, necessarily denies, that we can take any cognizance of the objects of religious faith. Those objects we cannot be acquainted with; they cannot even by Omnipotence be revealed to us, because we are endowed with no capacity to perceive them. Divine revelation does not make them known to us; it merely assures us, that off in a world, of which we know nothing, such objects do really exist. The fact of their existence we cannot judge of, and we must take it solely on the authority of him who reports it. The credibility of the reporter becomes, therefore, the question. If he be worthy of credit, then we may believe that the spiritual world is a reality; if he be not worthy of credit, then we have no evidence of the existence of a world transcending the world of the senses and that of our own minds. By what means can the credibility of the reporter be established? By miracles, addressed to the senses. The Divine authority of him, whom God commissioned to speak to us in his name, Mr. Norton assures us, can be attested only by miraculous displays of his power. Miracles, if they occurred every day, would cease to be miracles, as we learn from the erudite Dr. Palfrey. Consequently, they can occur only at distant intervals. The great mass of mankind cannot, therefore, be eye-witnesses of miracles, and must depend on the record, which may be made of them. They can have no evidence of their actual occurrence, but the evidence of history, written or unwritten. But, of the truth of the history, as things

go, they cannot judge. The generality of men must, then, rely on the testimony of the few scholars, who have leisure and means to investigate the proofs of its genuineness and authenticity. The fact of the occurrence of the miracles, by which we establish the authority of the reporter, whose authority must, in turn, establish the fact, that off in the vast unknown, there is a spiritual world, in which we should believe, — but whether it really exists, or not, we can never know, — must be taken by the generality, on the authority of a few learned men. According to Mr. Norton, in his "Latest Form of Infidelity," already quoted, the condition of faith in Christianity, for the great mass of mankind, is "trust in the capacity and honesty of others." We must rely on the knowledge of others, which reliance "*may be called belief on trust, or belief on authority.*"

This, it will be seen at once, leaves Christianity, for the great mass of mankind, a very doubtful matter; for who will assure us, that these privileged few, this learned caste, are not themselves deceived, or at least deceivers? May not these scholars have an interest in deceiving us? Do they not derive rank, consideration, and wealth, from inducing us to believe what they tell us? And do they not, by inducing us to believe them, really become our masters? Let the people once entertain a suspicion of this sort, and you will need an inquisition, dungeons, fire, and sword, to maintain even a decent outward regard to religion. On the other hand, this doctrine of belief on authority, if once admitted, strikes at the root of all free faith in God, all voluntary obedience to his command; perpetuates the worst features of Catholicism, establishes a sacerdotal caste, and plunges the human race into the gloomiest and most debasing of all servitudes. It is essentially a skeptical doctrine, and strikes at the root of all faith. They, who support it, fear that the human mind, if left to its own free and honest action, would reject all religion, and they, therefore, seek to keep up religion by means of coer-

cion. It is this doctrine, which has done and is doing so much mischief to the Church. The worst of all heresies is that, which strikes out from the human soul the capacity to see and know God.

But we cannot pursue this train of remark further. What we have thus far said, applies not, we readily own, to all the individuals who belong to the whig party. We have described the party, not according to the actual characters of its members, but according to the principle, which lies at the bottom of its reasoning, and its measures. We have seized the ultimate doctrine of the party, and pointed out the results, to which it must inevitably come, in the development of its idea, providing it meets, as we have said, with no counteracting force from without. Viewed as the opposite of the democratic party, in the light of its own peculiar, fundamental principle, it is the anti-progress party, the anti-American party, and the anti-Christian party. Its complete triumph would be fatal to the progress of the race, to the development of American institutions, and to the continuance of the Christian religion. This fact shows at once, that so long as there is an overruling Providence, there can be no ground to apprehend its success. It will always fail. Yesterday never returns. When yesterday becomes to-day, or to-day to-morrow, the whigs will come into power throughout the United States, but not till then. The friends of progress, of reform, men whose faces are on the front side of their heads, and whose hearts are in the future, and whose souls leap up to meet the good that is to be, we are sure cannot, for one moment, dream of uniting their fortunes with those of the whigs. Nothing remains for them, then, but to unite with the democratic party, so called, and through that labor to carry the race forward to its destiny.

The democratic party is the American party. That party is the American party, which gathers round the idea, which it is the mission of American institutions to realize. The idea, which lies at the bottom of our

institutions, is the supremacy of Man. Here is to be established and developed not the sovereignty of the sacerdotaly, not the sovereignty of the city or state, not the sovereignty of the king, not the sovereignty of the noble few, the high born, not that of the rich, nor yet that of estates, or corporations, but the sovereignty of Man. Here man is not made for the state, but the state is instituted for man. The order of civilization, which it is ours to develop, is an order of civilization, in which things are subordinate, and subservient to Humanity. Humanity, in all its integrity, is in every individual man. Then every individual man is to be raised to empire, so that all shall be, in the language of Scripture, "kings and priests." This is the American idea. This idea in the political world is translated by universal suffrage, that is, the equal right of every man to his voice in the choice of political agents, and through them, in the laws, which shall be enacted, or governmental measures, which shall be adopted. Now, is not the democratic party the acknowledged universal suffrage party? From the first, it has regarded suffrage as a right belonging to every man, by virtue of his human nature, and it has contended, that the people, taken individually, have not only the right, but, taken collectively, will exercise it judiciously, ultimately in accordance with the public good, and universal reason. The whig party waives the question of right, contends that the people are not sufficiently enlightened to be *entrusted* with universal suffrage, and that we ought to educate them before we allow them the *privilege* of voting.

The democratic party is also the patriotic party. It is the party jealous of national honor. The whig party, composed in the main of business men, whose idea is property, not man, are insensible to national honor, when its maintenance requires the sacrifice of the facilities of trade or commerce. In their estimation, the national honor is well enough, when they are making large profits, and is endangered only when their chances of gain seem to be diminished.

Hence it is, that every measure taken to maintain the honor of the nation, or to enhance its real prosperity, has been taken by the democratic party, amidst the most violent, and all but treasonable hostility of the whigs. The democracy purchased Louisiana, and thus secured to trade the Mississippi, to agriculture an immense territory of unrivalled fertility, and to free institutions many millions of supporters. The democracy declared and sustained the war against Great Britain, in which we vindicated our national honor, and asserted the freedom of the seas. And during its continuance, the whig party were plotting treason with the enemy, refusing all support to the government of their country, and cutting off, as far as they could, its supplies. It was the democracy also, that compelled France, much against the will of the opposition, to do us tardy justice for its spoiliations of our commerce.

The democratic party is the party of liberty. This is involved in the fact, that it is the American party. The idea of this country is, we have said, the supremacy of Man. This supremacy is attained only by the broadest freedom. The American idea, under another aspect, then, is that of liberty. The truly American party always rallies around the quickening idea of liberty. No man can have the hardihood to pretend, that liberty is the idea, the whigs are struggling to bring out. The whig party is not particularly anxious to sustain or extend liberty, even according to its own account. Its sole objects, taken as its own witness, are the preservation of the Union of the States, and the support of the credit system. In this, it is true to itself. It is the business party of the country, and it is, and must be true to its idea. The Union of the States was, and is desirable, almost solely on account of the interests of trade and commerce. It facilitates trade between the different States, and gives us an imposing aspect, which favors our foreign commerce. Take away the aid, which the Union of the States gives to trade and commerce, and the whigs

would estimate its value somewhat below par. Their cry about the preservation of the Union, does not, then, proceed from their anxiety to maintain freedom, but to preserve certain advantages to trade. It is in relation to its bearing on business operations, that they wish to sustain the credit system. So that their dominant idea, according to their own showing, is the preservation or increase of facilities for business operations. They pursue business, of course, for the purpose of accumulating property. So in the last analysis the dominant idea of the whigs is not MAN, but PROPERTY; and the contest between them and the democracy was rightly declared by Mr. Benton to be a contest between MAN and MONEY.

As the whig party is the party seeking to give pre-dominance not to the idea of freedom, but to the idea of property, the protection of which Locke declares to be the end of government, it follows, that the democratic party is the party of freedom, or else we have no such party in this country. Its history proves that it is. In all controversies, it takes the side of liberty. In the convention which framed the Federal Constitution, it opposed centralism, and defended State rights. In the conventions which have framed our State constitutions, it has always favored those clauses, which leave the most liberty to the people, and best protect the rights of the individual. In the great struggle between the aristocratic and democratic elements of European society, which broke out in the French Revolution, and which has been continued, with various success, even to our own times, it has always sympathized with the people, and rejoiced in their successes. Its sympathies were with France, so long as France represented the democracy; while the whigs, or federalists, sympathized with England, as the representative of the aristocracy. In the late unsuccessful struggle of the Canadians for independence, the democratic party has been true to its idea of liberty. It has given them its sympathies and its prayers, and trusts yet to see the Canadas a free and independent

nation. The day of emancipation yet lingers, but it will come, and we shall have a great and noble people for our Northern neighbor.

The democratic party has always been faithful to freedom of mind and conscience, the basis of all freedom. It has always opposed everything even approaching a religious establishment, and contended, that man's intercourse with his Maker should be free and voluntary. It has opposed all test laws, and uniformly frowned upon every effort to molest a man for his opinions. It inserted in the Federal Constitution the amendments, which forbid Congress to establish a religion, or to pass any law prohibiting freedom of speech, or of the press. It opposed the elder Adams and his party, because, in their Alien and Sedition Laws, they proved themselves the enemies of free thought, and free utterance; and it raised Thomas Jefferson to the Presidential chair, because he was the unflinching friend of freedom of mind. It has always said, with Milton, "Let truth and falsehood grapple. Who ever knew truth put to the worse in free and open encounter? Her confuting is the best and surest suppressing."

The democratic party is the Christian party. Christianity is a revelation of God's mercy to man. It is always on the side of freedom and Humanity. It addresses man as endowed with the capacity to judge of himself what is or is not right. Democracy is based on the fact, that man does really possess this capacity. Christianity, by addressing itself to all men, necessarily recognises this capacity in every man; democracy, by defending universal suffrage, does the same. Christianity values man for his simple Humanity, not for his trappings, the accidents of birth, wealth, or position; so does democracy. Christianity, aside from its design to fit the individual for communion with the blest after death, seeks to introduce a new order of things on the earth, to exalt the humble, abash the proud, to establish the reign of justice, and enable every man to "sit under his own vine and fig-

tree, with none to molest or make afraid ; " and who knows not that this is the aim and tendency of the democratic party ?

Christianity recognises God as the only rightful sovereign, and regards all government not founded by him, as usurpation. Man is bound to obey God, and God only. Therefore, it commands us to call no man master on earth, for one is our master in heaven. Translated into the language of politics, this teaches us, that government is legitimate, and laws are obligatory only as they represent the will of God, that is, the decrees of eternal and immutable Justice. Is not this the doctrine of the democratic party ? Jefferson, a good authority on this point, says, " the will of the majority must govern, but in order to govern rightfully, it must be just." The orations and addresses named at the head of this article, as well as several others now lying before us, delivered by democrats on the last Anniversary of our Independence, with one accord, assert the supremacy of Justice ; and the whole party adopts the definition of democracy, given in a Lecture by the Historian of the United States ; " Democracy is Eternal Justice ruling through the People." Justice is the political name of God. The reign of Justice is the reign of God ; and in defining democracy to be Eternal Justice ruling through the people, we identify the doctrine of the democratic party with the doctrine of the New Testament, namely, that government is of Divine ordination, and in all legitimate governments God is king.

The idea of justice, in all its length and breadth, is undoubtedly in every man ; but it exists in the individual mixed up with much, which belongs to the individual, rather than to the race. The individual, therefore, cannot be a safe interpreter of justice. For the voice of Eternal Justice he may mistake the voice of his own passions or interests. We must, therefore, listen to the voice of the race. The race can agree only in that, which is universal, invariable, and eternal, only in justice and truth. Hence, the unanimous

assent of the race is justly regarded as the highest evidence of truth. In order, then, to make as near an approach as possible to the decrees of Eternal Justice, we must place the government, not in the hands of one man, not in the hands of a few men, nor in the hands of a class, corporation, or estate, but in the hands of the whole people, whose voice will always be our best representative of the voice of the race, and whose decisions are the nearest approximation a nation can make to the decisions of Justice itself. Rightly, then, is Democracy defined Eternal Justice ruling through the People. Rightly, too, is the democratic party termed the Christian party, since it, like Christianity, acknowledges God alone as the rightful sovereign, and labors incessantly to wrest the government from the hands of individuals, classes, castes, estates, corporations, and to place it in the hands of the whole people, in their character of simple human beings, so that justice may reign on the earth.

The democratic party is the party of progress. This is involved in what has already been said. A party gathers round an idea, or principle, which is its life, its soul. That idea it can never abandon, and live; nor can it ever receive a new idea, without losing its identity. If left to itself, it will unfold, exhaust its idea; and having done this, it dies. Thus, English whiggism, having exhausted its original idea, having found its euthanasia, in the Reform Bill, has gone the way of all the earth, and is suffered to lie in state still, merely because neither Tories nor Radicals are prepared to assume the responsibility of heirs, and give it burial. The whigs in this country are demonstrating the same law. The idea, around which they gather, is offensive to a majority of the American people. This the more discerning of our whig friends perceive, and, therefore, they would fain change the doctrines of the party. They have even tried to make it pass for the democratic party. Vain efforts! They may change its name, receive into its

ranks many, who once thought themselves republicans, and submit to be led on by men, who once enjoyed the confidence of the democracy ; but nothing can change its character ; its identity remains ; and your Lincolns, Seldens, Duane, Verplancks, Tallmages, and Riveses, who generously undertake to give it a democratic aspect, can change nothing in its principles or direction, but are themselves swept away by its resistless current,

“ To that bourne, whence no traveller returns.”

The idea of the whig party is one, which cannot, in this country, rise to empire, because it is not broad enough to comprehend the work which God has given us to do. Always, therefore, will it be in the minority, or if not absolutely in the minority, so torn by intestine divisions, and so destitute of “ available ” leaders, that it must uniformly fail of success.

The democratic party is governed by the same law. It can receive no new idea, and it must share the fortunes of the idea with which it originally started. But there is a difference between the two parties. The whig party gathered around an idea, which is of a limited and transient nature ; the democratic party rallied round an idea, which is universal, immutable, and eternal. The whig seized upon one of the accidents of Humanity, the democrat upon Humanity itself. The democrat planted himself in the centre of the vast globe of Humanity, the whig placed himself on the circumference, where he hangs as a foreign substance, and from which he must be thrown the moment the globe revolves. The great idea of the democratic party is, as we have shown, under one aspect, the supremacy of man over his accidents, under another aspect, the reign of Eternal Justice. The two aspects are, in fact, one and the same. The mission of the democratic party is to unfold the great idea of Justice, and reduce it to practice in all man’s social and political relations. It stands, therefore, not as the representative of a fraction of the race, but of the race itself, and,

therefore, like the race, it is immortal. This great idea of justice the party is destined to realize. From this work it cannot withdraw itself, even if it would. Its leaders may be false to it, and seek to betray it; but it leaves them by the way, and with or without new leaders, continues its march. No matter how high a rank a man may have held in its estimation, the moment he proves false to the mission of the party, he is left, though leaving him be like plucking out a right eye, or cutting off a right hand. Nothing from within can betray it or divert it from its onward course. Many of the most active members of the whig party were once in its ranks, but it has not missed them. It is never in want of a man competent to lead on its forces, nor of an "available" candidate for its suffrages. A panic may now and then occur, and produce a momentary confusion, but it instantly recovers itself, reestablishes order, and takes up its line of march, ready to grapple with any force it may meet.

Now as the party, according to the general laws of party, must go on unfolding its idea, and as that idea is universal and all-comprehensive, we say truly, that it is the party of progress. Justice is its idea, and this idea it must unfold, and this idea in its unfolding must reach all the reforms the friends of progress can desire. Progress is simply the better and fuller application of Justice to our social and political relations. All the progress, which in the very nature of things now can be, must come from the unfolding of the idea which constitutes the life and soul of the democratic party. Then as friends of progress you should support that party, and contribute what you can to help it onward in the development and application of its general principles.

Are you contending for universal education? What principle will establish a true system of universal education, but that which declares the supremacy of Man over Money, and recognises Man in all his integrity in every individual man? Are you the advocate of the rights of woman? How will you succeed but by appeal-

ing to the great principle of the democracy, that Right is paramount to Might? Are you a non-resistant, a peac-eman? What means have you to compass your ends, but by aiding the democracy to introduce the rule of Justice into all public affairs? Are you an advocate for the working-man, anxious to secure to honest industry its due reward, and to the laborer his true social position? You must do it by means of that party which struggles to raise up universal Humanity, to abolish all Privilege, and to place the government in the hands of MAN, instead of MONEY. Are you an abolitionist, and would you free the slave? What party puts forth general principles which in their gradual unfolding must break every unjust bond, and set every captive free? The day of emancipation is not yet. It were useless to emancipate the slave to-day, because we should be merely changing the form not the substance of his slavery. But the democratic party puts forth principles, which must in the end abolish slavery, and do it too at the very day, the very hour, when it can be done with advantage to the cause of freedom, of justice. Slavery is doomed; man will not always tyrannize over man. There are causes at work, which will free the slave, and free him too with the consent and to the joy of his master. Let these causes work on, and do not murmur because their full effects are not realized to-day. God doubtless could have made the world in one day, but we are told that he chose to employ six days in creating it. The seed is not sown, and the corn harvested the same day. Be sure that you have principles in operation that will effect your work, and you may retain your composure. The democratic party embraces the idea of universal freedom to universal man, and it will realize this idea, just as fast as we can urge onward the general progress of Humanity, and no faster.

We have now given some of the reasons why reformers should sustain the democratic party. That party embraces the general principles of liberty, of progress, which include within them, as the oak is in-

cluded in the acorn, all possible reforms. It represents to-day, in this Western world, entire Humanity, and as such has a right to demand the hearty coöperation of every true friend of his race. We see many and essential reforms, for which we have labored, and still labor, which it has not yet taken up ; but we see that, following its principles, obeying the high laws to which in God's providence it is subjected, it must and will take them up in due time, and in due order. To-day it is engaged in rescuing the government from the grasp of associated wealth, which it will do by adopting the Independent Treasury Bill, and causing the revenues of the country to be collected and disbursed in gold and silver. When it has effected this, it will proceed to reform the banking system as it exists in the States. In what way it will reform the system, as the moment for acting has not yet come, it is not wholly agreed. Whether it will do it, by abolishing all banks and returning to an exclusively metallic currency, as is the wish of some, or by instituting a system of free banking, as is the wish of a still greater number, or by devising a new scheme based upon a combination of the elements of free banking with what may be termed government banking, as we ourselves should propose, it is at this moment impossible to determine ; but be it as it may, the party will dispose of the question in that way which shall best advance the cause of individual freedom and national prosperity. This question disposed of, the party will proceed to reform the judiciary, and to revise our criminal code. Then it will proceed to other reforms which perhaps have not yet been dreamed of save by a few visionaries, who would gain nothing but a smile of compassion were they to tell their dreams. Where it will stop we know not ; for we are not able to set bounds to the spirit of improvement, or to say where the progress of the race is to be arrested. We speak not as the seer, but as the philosopher, who, from the causes he sees in operation, and which he understands, infers the effects which must inevitably

follow, unless God changes the order of his providence. The reforms which the party effects in legislation, the principles which it infuses into public institutions, will gradually pass into social life, form our manners, our morals, and determine our social relations and intercourse.

Sinking now the editor, and speaking in my own name, I may say, here is my view of the democratic party, and here are my reasons for enrolling myself among its members. I have formed this view not hastily, nor without considerable reflection; I have adopted it only as I have been compelled by my general principles of politics, religion, and philosophy. I have never been a partisan. I have, it is true, always been a democrat. I sucked in democracy with my mother's milk; I imbibed a feeling and a love of independence, as I roamed a child over the Green Hills, or clambered up the scarp'd rocks, or plunged in the dark forests of my early home. I could not have been a Green Mountain Boy, bred in a mountain home, in what may one day be regarded as the Switzerland of America, without cherishing a free spirit, and becoming the friend of the "largest liberty." I have always been found on the side of freedom in its widest signification. To my love of it I have given years of intense study, sacrificed ease, sometimes reputation, pecuniary independence, and professional success. But, except on rare occasions, I have never acted with the democratic party so called. I have had many prejudices against it, and against its prominent members. I have thought it too intent on office, on maintaining itself as a party, and too indifferent to the progress and application of free principles. It may readily be believed, then, that I have not given in my adhesion, so unequivocally, without having been compelled by, what have seemed to me, cogent reasons. These reasons are given to some extent in this article. They are to me weighty and sufficient. They may be carped at, they may be denied; but I must give up all the confidence I have hitherto placed in religion or philosophy, before I can believe they can

be successfully refuted. I am therefore compelled, not merely to declare myself a democrat, but a democrat, if you will, in a party sense. I take my stand with the democratic party. Its fortunes, whatever they may be, I am content to share. If I can in any way aid it onward, and assist it in carrying out its principles, my ambition and my conscience will be satisfied. I say this in no partisan spirit, but in obedience to those broad principles of freedom, to which, with or without success, my life has thus far been devoted. I do this because I am required to do it by my love of freedom and of man, because through this party, and this party only, can be carried out into all the relations of life those great principles of justice, on which the institutions of this country are based. Through this party it is possible to reach Humanity; with it is bound up the cause of freedom in this country, on this continent, and throughout the world.

* * * THIS number completes the present volume, and ends the publication of the Boston Quarterly Review. The Review is discontinued not for the want of patronage, but because its editor has said his word; and because he finds, that his excessive labors, for the last few years, have impaired his health, and made it advisable for him to lie by for a while, and recruit. Should he hereafter have a word to utter, he doubtless will find some medium, through which to utter it, so that the public shall not suffer for the want thereof.

It is not, however, without a silent sadness, that I close this publication, which has occupied so much of my time and thoughts for the last two years. I have been rather its author than its editor, although I have received several valuable contributions, from some of my friends. Still, I look upon it with the affection of a father, and follow it to the grave not without a little swelling in the throat. It has made me somewhat known, procured me some valuable acquaintances, and made me feel in altogether better humor with the public, than was for many years my wont. For the manner in which the Community has received it, I am grateful. It has yielded me all the respect I asked. To my brethren of the press I am still more grateful. They have spoken of my labors in terms, which, though

flattering to me, I fear do more honor to the benevolence of their hearts, than justice to their critical sagacity.

I have no long valedictory to write. I commenced this work under every discouragement, and even against my own judgment. I commenced it because I could not help it. I made no calculations on success. I was unknown, or known only to my disadvantage. I felt, that I was almost wholly misconceived, that I was not to myself what that portion of the Boston public, who had heard of me, imagined. I felt I had that within me, if I could but tell it, which would command their respect, and induce them to listen even to my words. I have spoken as I could. I have succeeded better than I anticipated, and made the public think as well of me, as I think they ought. I part from the public, therefore, in good humor with them, and myself. If they have benefited by my labors, it is well; but whether they have or not, I have, and that, perhaps, is just as well.

One word more. The world has called me an infidel, and an agrarian. I am an infidel, I suppose, not because I believe less, but because I believe more than my neighbors. Yet, I may say that one great end I have had in view in this work has been, to suggest trains of thought, which should lead even the skeptical to a firm and living faith in God, Christ, and immortality. As to agrarianism, I have nothing to say. I am a democrat of long standing, and am determined as long as I live to labor for the great doctrine of equal rights, and social equality.

ORESTES AUGUSTUS BROWNSON.